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Opening the “Snake Pit”: Arming Teachers  
in the War Against School Violence and the 
Government-Created Risk Doctrine 
DANIELLE WEATHERBY 
In the aftermath of the horrific school shooting at Sandy Hook Elementary School in 
Newtown, Connecticut, parents, students, and school administrators began to fear the 
unthinkable—that a violent, ruthless criminal could invade their school campuses and 
randomly target innocent youth. Even though statistics show that violent crime in 
elementary and secondary schools is on the decline, trepidation and anxiety on school 
campuses across the country is at an all-time high. 
In response to this perceived threat, in 2013, lawmakers in over thirty states proposed 
bills that, if passed, would authorize school officials to carry weapons on their persons 
during the school day. Currently, at least eleven states have adopted this “armed-teachers” 
approach in fighting the war against school violence. 
This Article explores the potential § 1983 liability that the armed-teachers approach 
could create. Historically, § 1983 shields public schools from liability for the injuries 
resulting from the unforeseeable, violent acts of third parties. But when schools themselves 
invite the risk onto campus, they become vulnerable, throwing schoolchildren into the 
“snake pit” of danger and exposing themselves to liability under the government-created 
risk doctrine. Walking the reader through the elements of a state-created danger claim 
brought by a plaintiff whose injury or death was proximately caused by the armed-teachers 
approach, this Article examines the inherent risk involved in bringing firearms into schools, 
especially when guarded by inadequately trained, or in some cases untrained, teachers.  
Furthermore, where school districts adopt armed-teachers policies and fail to 
adequately train or supervise those teachers serving as quasi-security guards pursuant to 
their policy, they expose themselves to Monell liability. Most districts that have adopted this 
approach have done so for fiscal reasons, but because the cost of hiring security is lower 
than the cost of the risk of injury and resultant damages incurred by the school, the money-
saving justification is foolhardy and, at best, illogical. 
Finally, this Article cautions that schools must not lose sight of the appropriate role 
and function of our schoolteachers. With education reform and teacher effectiveness at the 
crux of a national debate, schools should be wary of muddying the role of our educators. 
Instead, schools should allow teachers to focus on educating and leave the patrol-work to 
the properly trained experts. 
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Opening the “Snake Pit”: Arming Teachers  
in the War Against School Violence and the 
Government-Created Risk Doctrine 
DANIELLE WEATHERBY* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Noah Pozner, age six, “had a huge heart[,] . . . was . . . a little bit 
rambunctious, [had] lots of spirit, . . . [and] was really the light of the 
room.”1 Grace McDonnell, age seven, had just celebrated her birthday by 
blowing out the candles on “a purple cake with a turquoise peace sign and 
polka dots.”2 Grace “was all about peace and gentleness and kindness.”3 
Chase Kowalski, age seven, loved baseball and the Cub Scouts and had 
just asked Santa Claus for his missing two front teeth for Christmas.4 Ben 
Wheeler, age seven, “loved The Beatles, lighthouses and the No. 7 train to 
Sunnyside, Queens.”5 He “was an irrepressibly bright and spirited boy 
whose love of fun and excitement at the wonders of life and the world 
could rarely be contained.”6  
On December 14, 2012, Noah, Grace, Chase, and Ben, along with 
sixteen of their peers and six educators, lost their young lives when the 
unthinkable happened at Sandy Hook Elementary School in Newtown, 
Connecticut.7 Within the span of approximately six horrific minutes, a lone 
shooter, armed with semiautomatic pistols and an assault rifle, entered the 
school and turned an entire nation upside-down.8  
                                                                                                                          
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Arkansas School of Law; J.D. 2005, University of 
Florida; B.A. 2002, Franklin and Marshall College. My deepest gratitude to Terri Day for her insightful 
comments on earlier drafts, to Wynne Tan and Garrett Wilkins, my incredibly hardworking research 
assistants, for their invaluable contributions, and to Kertis Weatherby, for his unwavering support. 
1 Remembering the Sandy Hook Elementary Victims, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/interactive/2012/ 
12/us/sandy-hook-victims/ [http://perma.cc/7WMA-58HM] (last visited Aug. 12, 2015). 
2 Id. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
7 James Barron, Gunman Massacres 20 Children at School in Connecticut; 28 Dead, Including 
Killer, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2012, at A1. 
8 Id.; George Colli, Sandy Hook: The First 15 Minutes, NBC CONN. (Aug. 26, 2013), 
http://www.nbcconnecticut.com/troubleshooters/Sandy-Hook-The-First-15-Minutes-221260161.html 
[http://perma.cc/FHP2-KXS7]. 
 
 
 122 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:119 
 
The 2012 Sandy Hook massacre is the latest in a litany of horrifying 
school shootings,9 including Columbine10 and the Virginia Tech11 
tragedies. Recently, it seems that law enforcement officials are intervening 
on a weekly, and sometimes even a daily, basis, preventing perpetrators 
from inflicting violence on school campuses.12 
                                                                                                                          
9 On October 1, 1997, sixteen-year-old Luke Woodham killed two students and wounded seven in 
Pearl, Mississippi. Timeline of Worldwide School and Mass Shootings: Gun-Related Tragedies in the 
U.S. and Around the World, INFOPLEASE, http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0777958.html#ixzz 
2vJejlayE [http://perma.cc/X4XM-4XUD]. On December 15, 1997, fourteen-year-old Colt Todd 
wounded two students when he shot at students in the parking lot in Stamps, Arkansas. Id. On March 
24, 1998, thirteen-year-old Mitchell Johnson and eleven-year-old Andrew Golden killed four students 
and one teacher and injured ten others outside Westside Middle School in Jonesboro, Arkansas. Id. On 
May 21, 1998, fifteen-year-old Kip Kinkel killed two students and wounded twenty-two others in the 
cafeteria of his Springfield, Oregon high school. Id. On February 29, 2000, a six-year-old shot young 
classmate Kayla Rolland dead with a .32-caliber handgun at Buell Elementary School near Flint, 
Michigan. Id. On March 21, 2005, sixteen-year-old Jeff Weise killed a teacher, security guard, five 
students, and finally himself at his Red Lake, Minnesota middle school. Id. On September 27, 2006, six 
students were held hostage at the Platte Canyon High School in Bailey, Colorado before one of the 
students was killed by the perpetrator. Id. On October 3, 2006, thirty-two-year-old Carl Charles Roberts 
IV killed five girls and himself and injured five other girls at West Nickel Mines Amish School in 
Nickel Mines, Pennsylvania. Id. On February 14, 2008, former Northern Illinois graduate student 
Stephen Kazmierczak shot and killed five students and wounded seventeen more in a classroom on the 
Northern Illinois University campus. Id. On January 5, 2011, two people were killed and two injured 
during a shooting at Millard South High School in Omaha, Nebraska. Id. On February 27, 2012, a 
former student killed three students and injured six at Chardon High School in Chardon, Ohio. Id. 
10 On April 20, 1999, in the small town of Littleton, Colorado, two high school seniors, Dylan 
Klebold and Eric Harris, entered Columbine High School with guns, bombs, and knives during the 
middle of the day and brutally murdered twelve students and a teacher. Columbine High School 
Shootings, HISTORY, http://www.history.com/topics/columbine-high-school-shootings [http://perma.cc/ 
KY7R-A63F] (last visited Sept. 12, 2015). 
11 On April 16, 2007, Seung-Hui Cho, a senior at Virginia Polytechnic Institute in Blacksburg, 
Virginia, shot and killed thirty-two people on the campus before taking his own life. Virginia Tech 
Shootings Fast Facts, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2013/10/31/us/virginia-tech-shootings-fast-facts/ 
[http://perma.cc/ZE68-R7FB] (last updated Apr. 13, 2015). 
12 See, e.g., Documents: Concerned Citizen Halted Teen’s Plan to Attack School, DODGE CITY 
DAILY GLOBE (May 3, 2014), http://www.dodgeglobe.com/article/20140503/News/140509748 [http:// 
perma.cc/BL53-C3FA] (summarizing events that led to law enforcement officers’ arresting a 
seventeen-year-old Minnesota boy who outlined in a 180-page journal his plans to kill his family, set a 
fire to divert first responders, and then go to his school with bombs and guns and “kill as many students 
as he could”); Chuck Hickey & Kent Erdahl, 3 Weld Central High School Students Arrested After 
Alleged Threat, FOX31 (May 13, 2014), http://kdvr.com/2014/05/13/two-weld-central-high-school-
students-arrested-after-alleged-threat/ [http://perma.cc/8GAL-XMBK] (discussing the arrest of three 
high school students after an alleged threat was made at Weld Central High School in Keenesburg, 
Colorado); Michelle McConnaha, Hamilton High Student Charged with Graduation Shooting Threat, 
MISSOULIAN (June 4, 2014), http://missoulian.com/news/local/hamilton-high-student-charged-with-
graduation-shooting-threat/article_dfe0ca84-eb79-11e3-808a-001a4bcf887a.html [http://perma.cc/FF 
2H-N9PN] (describing facts that led to the arrest of eighteen-year-old Adam Michael Chambers for 
plotting to shoot students with an assault rifle at graduation); Gamaliel Ortiz, Arrests Made in Gun-
Related Threats Against Whitney, Rocklin High Schools, KCRA.COM (May 30, 2014), 
http://www.kcra.com/news/local-news/news-sacramento/arrests-made-in-gunrelated-threats-agai nst-
whitney-rocklin-high-schools/26244398#!UY4Jc [http://perma.cc/L7N8-VQST] (detailing events that 
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With children as targets and school campuses seemingly vulnerable to 
attack, parents, teachers, and administrators face difficult, perhaps 
unanswerable, questions. At what point did school campuses become 
battlegrounds, where schoolchildren go to learn in an environment 
permeated with fear and terror? Do schools have a legal duty to protect 
students from the random, unforeseeable violent acts of third parties?  
What measures should schools take to anticipate and prevent these 
unthinkable acts? Should teachers and school administrators actively 
participate in schools’ efforts to guard and protect the children in their 
custody by carrying weapons on their persons during the school day? Are 
teachers the appropriate individuals to assume the role of security guards, 
and are they adequately trained to use a weapon effectively during a fast-
paced, traumatic, live-shooter event?  
Schools have responded to these questions by implementing a variety 
of measures to improve school safety. Safety measures on K-12 campuses 
include the use of metal detectors, the presence of security guards, rules 
and regulations regarding student conduct and dress, profiling of 
potentially violent students, anti-bullying instructional programs, and 
counseling and mediation.13   
Despite the use of these broad measures, the National Rifle 
Association and conservative-minded lawmakers insist that representatives 
of every school in the country should be armed with guns in anticipation of 
an attack.14 Consistent with this line of thinking, several states have 
adopted a radical approach to protecting students from the unforeseeable, 
violent crimes of third parties by arming teachers and school administrators 
with handguns during the school day.15   
                                                                                                                          
led to arrest of an eighteen-year old and two minors on suspicion of gun-related violence targeted at 
two high schools in Sacramento, California).  
13 See SIMONE ROBERS ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INDICATORS OF 
SCHOOL CRIME AND SAFETY: 2012, at 168 (2013) (detailing various safety measures used by schools 
from 1999–2010). 
14 See Thomas Christoph Keller, Comment, ABC’s and AR-15’s: Arming Arkansas’s Teachers, 67 
ARK. L. REV. 687, 687 (2014) (quoting the infamous proclamation made by NRA CEO Wayne 
LaPierre in the wake of the Sandy Hook massacre that “[t]he only thing that stops a bad guy with a gun 
is a good guy with a gun”). 
15 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 45-30-103 (Westlaw through 2015 amendments); ARK. CODE ANN.       
§ 17-40-102 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-7c10 (West, Westlaw 
through 2015 legislation); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 13-64-1 (Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.); TENN. 
CODE ANN. § 49-6-815 (West, Westlaw through 2015 1st Reg. Sess.); TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN.             
§ 37.0811 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 46 of 2015 Reg. Sess.); S.B. 164, 90th Gen. Assemb., Reg. 
Sess. (Ark. 2015) (enacted). In addition, some institutions of higher learning are allowing students to 
bring firearms to campus. E.g., Ian Millhiser, Five Pennsylvania State Schools Now Allowing Students 
to Bring Guns on Campus, THINKPROGRESS (May 14, 2013, 5:50 PM), http://thinkprogress.org/justice/ 
2013/05/14/2011711/five-pennsylvania-state-schools-now-allowing-students-to-bring-guns-on-campus/ 
[http://perma.cc/JY4R-4SFH] (reporting that in Pennsylvania, five state colleges and universities have 
authorized students to carry guns on campus). 
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To date, no school utilizing this strategy has faced a live-shooter 
situation. However, research and anecdotal evidence suggest that 
equipping teachers and school administrators with guns increases the risk 
of harm to students; studies testing the efficacy of police training to 
prepare officers for live-shooter situations demonstrate that even the best 
training produces high rates of misfiring and bystander injuries.16 In light 
of this evidence, it is readily apparent that teachers would be much less 
effective than police officers in wielding guns during a live-shooter 
situation. A recent training exercise in Arkansas during which a pro-gun 
senator accidentally shot an actor posing as a teacher with a rubber bullet 
illustrates that arming the untrained actually increases the likelihood of 
harm during a live-shooter event. 17   
This Article posits that while arming teachers may appear to be cost 
effective and gives the perception of greater safety, it actually creates a 
greater risk of foreseeable harm to students and exposes schools to legal 
liability. Generally, schools owe no legal duty to protect students from 
violence caused by third parties.18 However, this strict no-duty rule has 
exceptions. Arming teachers constitutes a government-created danger and 
pierces the no-duty rule. While schools, as government entities, and 
teachers acting within the scope of their official duties are shielded from 
liability based on common-law negligence, they can be held legally liable 
for civil rights violations.19 The “armed teachers” model generates a 
government-created risk, exposing schools to liability under 42 U.S.C.       
§ 1983 and ultimately frustrating its essential purpose: protecting children 
and limiting school district liability. 
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part II summarizes school districts’ 
varying responses to the rising threats of violence in the elementary and 
secondary school setting. Part III first presents an overview of the current 
legal landscape governing school district liability, cautioning districts that 
courts have limited schools’ immunity to those situations in which the risk 
involved was unforeseeable and outside the school’s direct control. It then 
introduces two exceptions to the general no-duty rule: (1) where injury is 
                                                                                                                          
16 See infra notes 130–34 and accompanying text. 
17 Beth Stebner, Arkansas State Senator Fires Back at Claims He Accidentally Shot Teacher in 
Simulated School Shooting Exercise, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 29, 2013, 2:57 PM), http://www.nydaily 
news.com/news/politics/state-sen-fires-back-claims-shot-teacher-simulated-shooting-article-1.1440705; 
Igor Volsky, Oops: Senator Who Advocates Arming Teachers Accidentally Shoots Teacher with 
Rubber Bullet, THINKPROGRESS (Aug. 29, 2013, 12:14 PM), http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2013/08/ 
29/2550001/oops-senator-advocates-arming-teacher-accidentally-shoots-teacher-rubber-bullet [http://pe 
rma.cc/8G6V-4PKG]. 
18 See, e.g., Morrow v. Balaski, 719 F.3d 160, 167, 170 (3d Cir. 2013) (explaining that public 
schools have a constitutional duty to protect students from harm caused by third parties only if there is 
a “special relationship” between the school and the student and citing case law from other circuits 
holding that there is generally no such relationship). 
19 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). 
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caused by a government-created danger, and (2) where a municipality 
failed to adequately train its employees after implementing a policy that 
clearly necessitates proper training. Part IV analyzes the potential for 
teacher liability when a gun-related injury or death is proximately caused 
by the armed-teachers approach. It concludes that armed-teacher victims, 
under the government-created risk doctrine, will be able to proceed at least 
beyond the motion-to-dismiss stage, exposing teachers to § 1983 liability. 
Part V then analyzes a school district’s potential Monell liability, 
predicated upon the district’s adoption of an armed-teachers policy without 
providing adequate training to its employees.   
In conclusion, this Article suggests a roadmap for combating school 
violence and cautions schools to be wary of muddying the role of our 
schoolteachers. With education reform and teacher effectiveness at the 
crux of a national debate, this Article advises schools to allow teachers to 
focus on educating, and leave the patrol-work to the properly-trained 
experts. 
II.  SCHOOL DISTRICTS’ RESPONSES TO THREATS                                                
OF VIOLENCE ON CAMPUS 
In the wake of the last few decades, during which horrific tragedies 
like Columbine, Virginia Tech, and Sandy Hook became a real peril to 
schoolchildren across the country, parents of primary and secondary 
schoolchildren began to perceive,20 justifiably or not,21 a heightened threat 
                                                                                                                          
20 See, e.g., EDWARD GAUGHAN ET AL., LETHAL VIOLENCE IN SCHOOLS: A NATIONAL STUDY 2 
(2001), http://www.alfred.edu/teenviolence/docs/lethal_violence_in_schools.pdf [http://perma.cc/4R3 
R-463C] (indicating that more than 75% of secondary schoolchildren believe that a school shooting 
could occur in their community); Lydia Saad, Parents’ Fear for Children’s Safety at School Rises 
Slightly, GALLUP (Dec. 28, 2012), http://www.gallup.com/poll/159584/parents-fear-children-safety-
school-rises-slightly.aspx (indicating that more than 50% of parents of primary and secondary 
schoolchildren believe that a school shooting is “very or somewhat likely” to occur in their 
community); School Violence, Gun-Related Injuries in Top 10 Child Health Concerns in U.S., 22 C.S. 
MOTT CHILD. HOSP. NAT’L POLL ON CHILD. HEALTH 1 (2014), http://mottnpch.org/sites/default/files/ 
documents/081114_top10.pdf [http://perma.cc/GG9K-A3AM] (finding that school violence and gun-
related injuries were fifth and ninth, respectively, in the national top ten child health concerns list).   
21 See DIANNA A. DRYSDALE ET AL., CAMPUS ATTACKS: TARGETED VIOLENCE AFFECTING 
INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION 11 (2010), http://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/safety/campus-
attacks.pdf [http://perma.cc/3RJB-37RQ] (analyzing the circumstances and potential reasons for the 
increase in violence over the last two decades on college campuses and noting that the spike could be 
caused by increased enrollment, media coverage, and digital reporting). But see NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. 
STATISTICS & BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, INDICATORS OF SCHOOL CRIME AND SAFETY 2001, at 
iii (2001), http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2002/2002113a.pdf [http://perma.cc/Q9H6-VGFU] (indicating a 
decrease in violent crime in schools); Todd A. DeMitchell, Locked Down and Armed: Security 
Responses to Violence in Our Schools, 13 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 275, 278 (2014) (“[S]chool-associated 
violent deaths are rare and declining.”). 
 126 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:119 
 
of violence on campus.22 In response to this perceived threat, lawmakers, 
school administrators, and parent advocacy groups have implemented 
various approaches to minimize the risk.  
Aimed at preventing the most extreme forms of violence, among the 
most commonplace safety measures used in schools today are weapons 
deterrence23 and the use of campus security and police officers.24 In the 
2009–2010 school year, 84% of high schools, 73% of middle schools, and 
51% of primary schools reported that they used security cameras to 
monitor their schools.25 In addition, schools commonly use metal detectors 
and conduct searches on student lockers and bags, especially in large urban 
middle and high schools.26  
School districts and local law enforcement are increasingly teaming up 
to ensure that more campuses have a security-guard presence. According to 
the National Center on Education Statistics, 43% of schools reported the 
presence of one or more security guards, security personnel, School 
Resource Officers (SROs), or sworn law enforcement officers at their 
schools at least once a week during the school year.27 Of that 43%, 12% of 
primary schools, 25% of all combined K-12 schools, 51% of middle 
schools, and 63% of high schools reported that their security officers 
routinely carried a firearm at school.28   
President Barack Obama has allotted millions of dollars nationwide to 
fund more SROs in schools that opt to utilize them.29 This executive 
                                                                                                                          
22 School Violence, Gun-Related Injuries Among Top 10 Child Health Concerns in U.S., supra 
note 20. 
23 In 1990, Congress passed the Gun-Free School Zones Act, which made it unlawful for “any 
individual knowingly to possess a firearm” in a school zone. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (1998 ed., Supp. 
V.). After facing a constitutional challenge in the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Lopez, 514 
U.S. 549 (1995), where the Court held that the law exceeded Congress’ authority under the Commerce 
Clause, id. at 551, the law was amended to forbid the possession in a school zone of a firearm that “has 
moved in or that otherwise affects” interstate commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A) (2012). The law 
does not appear to prohibit school districts from allowing teachers or other school officials to carry or 
discharge firearms on campus pursuant to a district-sanctioned security program. At the state level, 
“almost all states and D.C. prohibit guns in K-12 schools, but only 39 states and D.C. apply this 
prohibition to people who have been granted a permit to carry a concealed weapon.” Guns in Schools 
Policy Summary, LAW CTR. TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE (Nov. 1, 2013), http://smartgunlaws.org/ 
guns-in-schools-policy-summary/#footnote_29_5686 [http://perma.cc/5CUF-6L5R].  
24 ROBERS ET AL., supra note 13, at 86–88 (noting that 43% of K-12 and 28% of primary schools 
reported the presence of one or more security staff at their school at least once a week in 2009–2010). 
25 Id. at 84. 
26 Id. at 86. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. at 88. 
29 See Evan Perez & Bryan Koenig, Obama Admin Funding Cops in Schools, CNN (Sept. 27, 
2013, 4:31 PM), http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2013/09/27/obama-admin-borrows-a-page-from-
the-nra-funding-cops-in-schools/ [http://perma.cc/5RXL-LH7V] (explaining that the Community 
Oriented Policing Services grants, about $125 million over a three-year period and announced annually 
by the Justice Department, will be given priority to place armed police officers in schools); see also 
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support follows the trend initiated by former President Bill Clinton in 1999 
when he introduced the Safe Schools/Healthy Students Initiative and 
provided federal funding to over fifty communities for anti-violence 
programming.30 In 2000, former President Clinton bolstered the use of 
campus officers by providing more than $60 million to support 452 
officers nationwide as part of the Justice Department’s COPS in Schools 
program.31  
With a rising number of schools utilizing SROs on campus, skeptics 
and critics on both sides of the “guns-in-school” debate are passionately 
voicing their concerns. Advocates of placing armed representatives on     
K-12 campuses urge either for a larger presence or a more aggressive role, 
outraged that shootings are still occurring at schools, while opponents 
argue that the presence of SROs is unnecessary, ineffective, or overly 
burdensome and expensive.32 In fact, opponents point to the fact that 
Columbine high school employed an armed security officer on April 20, 
1999.33 Although community resource officer Neil Gardner engaged in a 
shootout with perpetrator Eric Harris, the exchange of gunfire did not deter 
Harris from entering the school building and continuing on with his killing 
spree.34   
Wherever one’s position lies with respect to the use of security 
measures in K-12 schools, most can agree that armed security officers, if 
used, should be properly trained and well-prepared to respond to another 
Columbine- or Sandy Hook-like event. Several organizations have created 
training programs for school security, including programs designed to 
simulate a live-shooter situation.35 Still, in an effort to cut costs, many 
                                                                                                                          
DeMitchell, supra note 21, at 283 (summarizing the executive response to the shooting at Sandy Hook 
Elementary School). 
30 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Clinton Administration Launches $300 Million Program 
for Safe Schools (Apr. 1, 1999), http://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/1999/April/114ag.htm 
[http://perma.cc/9P78-4MJM].  
31 Lawrence L. Knutson, Clinton Pledges Funds to Add Police to Schools, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 16, 
2000), http://articles.latimes.com/2000/apr/16/news/mn-20323 [http://perma.cc/XNB3-7WRP].  
32 Compare William J. Bennett, The Case for Gun Rights Is Stronger than You Think, CNN (Dec. 
19, 2012, 3:54 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/12/19/opinion/bennett-gun-rights [http://perma.cc 
/HUC9-8L7P] (arguing that firearms are the best defense against an armed attacker), with LZ 
Granderson, Teachers with Guns Is a Crazy Idea, CNN (Dec. 19, 2012, 3:57 PM), http://www.cnn.com 
/2012/12/19/opinion/granderson-guns-in-schools/index.html?iref=allsearch [http://perma.cc/XNQ6-FE 
4K] (“[W]hen it comes to our schools, we don’t need guns at all.”), and School Resource Officers Are a 
Waste of Resources, Says New Report, JUSTICE POL’Y INST. (Nov. 15, 2011), http://www.justice 
policy.org/news/3178 [http://perma.cc/H2FN-DT9X] (“[H]aving school resource officers . . . and other 
police in schools causes more harm than good.”).  
33 Amanda Terkel, Columbine High School Had Armed Guard During Massacre in 1999, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 21, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/12/21/columbine-armed-
guards_n_2347096.html [http://perma.cc/MCY7-H65E]. 
34 Id.  
35 See, e.g., TACTICAL DEFENSE INST., http://tdiohio.com/home_page/ [http://perma.cc/BB57-
2VZ9] (last visited Sept. 19, 2015). The Tactical Defense Institute, a West Union, Ohio organization 
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states have passed legislation or are interpreting existing legislation to 
allow teachers and administrators to carry guns on campus during the 
school day.36 In 2013, more than thirty state legislatures introduced bills 
that would permit school officials to carry guns on public or private school 
campuses.37   
Among others, states like Arkansas,38 Kansas,39 Colorado,40 South 
Dakota,41 Tennessee,42 Texas,43 and Utah44 authorize schools to allow 
teachers and other personnel to carry firearms on campus during the school 
day. Notably, these laws indicate a vast disparity regarding the amount of 
required training for teachers participating in armed-teachers programs. 
For example, Kansas law leaves it up to a governing school body, such as a 
school board, to prescribe any training requirements, while the Tennessee 
law requires all teachers participating in such a program to complete a 
forty-hour training program.45 The Georgia “guns-everywhere” law allows 
boards of education to adopt an armed-teachers policy, but it does not set 
forth a minimum number of training hours for participating teachers and 
school staff.46 Utah is one of the only states that authorizes individuals who 
hold concealed carry permits to carry licensed, concealed weapons onto 
public school campuses without exception.47 Utah teachers do not have any 
                                                                                                                          
training civilians and law enforcement and military personnel, offers the recently created “Armed 
Teacher Training Program,” a three-day program that trains civilians and officers on how to respond to 
school shootings. Armed Teacher Training Program, TACTICAL DEFENSE INST., http://tdiohio.com/ 
active-killer-shooter-leciv/ [http://perma.cc/948B-T3W6] (last visited Sept. 19, 2015); see also Joshua 
Jamerson, Teachers Pack Heat at Gun School, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Mar. 28, 2013), 
http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2013/03/27/Teachers-learn-to-shoot-in-the-classroom 
.html [http://perma.cc/YX27-LE6N] (describing the above-mentioned program).   
36 See, e.g., Keller, supra note 14, at 688–89 (recounting the efforts of some school districts in 
Arkansas to lawfully arm public school employees).  
37 COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS JUSTICE CTR., ARMING TEACHERS AND K-12 SCHOOL STAFF: A 
SNAPSHOT OF LEGISLATIVE ACTION 1 (2014), http://csgjusticecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/ 
NCSL-Arming-Staff-Brief.pdf [http://perma.cc/8RUV-QD6J].  
38 ARK. CODE ANN. § 17-40-102(10), (19) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.); S.B. 164, 
90th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2015) (enacted). 
39 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-7c10(d) (West, Westlaw through 2015 legislation). 
40 Nick McGurk, Rural Colo. School Allowing Teachers to Carry Handguns, USA TODAY (Oct. 
31, 2013, 9:01 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/10/31/colorado-teachers-guns-
schools/3323807 [http://perma.cc/5CUX-HGYM].  
41 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 13-64-1 (Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.). 
42 TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-815 (1), (2) (West, Westlaw through 2015 1st Reg. Sess.). 
43 TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 37.0811(c) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 46 of 2015 Reg. Sess.). 
44 UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-505.5 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Gen. Sess.). 
45 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-7c10(d) (West, Westlaw through 2015 legislation); TENN. CODE ANN.   
§ 49-6-815(a)(3) (West , Westlaw through 2015 1st Reg. Sess.). 
46 Safe Carry Protection Act, § 16-11-130.1(b), 2014 Ga. Laws 599, 616. 
47 UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-505.5(4)(a) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Gen. Sess.). 
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specific requirements other than those required to obtain concealed carry 
permits.48 
III.  PROTECTING THE HERD: SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS OF SCHOOL 
DISTRICTS’ LEGAL DUTY TO PROTECT 
When a child falls victim to a shooting on a public school campus, her 
parents and survivors have few legal remedies. Generally, schools and 
teachers cannot be sued in their official capacities for negligence unless 
sovereign immunity is waived.49 Injured parties may, however, bring a 
federal cause of action against a school district, as an arm of the 
government, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.50 That section provides an avenue 
through which a plaintiff can sue a state entity in federal court for the 
deprivation of her constitutional rights.51 Section 1983 holds liable anyone 
acting under color of state law who “subjects, or causes to be subjected, 
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction 
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured 
by the Constitution and [federal] laws.”52 A § 1983 claimant must satisfy 
two elements: (1) she was “deprived of an existing federal right,” and (2) 
“the deprivation occurred under color of state law.”53  
With respect to gun-related injuries, the constitutional right implicated 
in § 1983 actions is the Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive due process 
right.54 The touchstone of due process is protection against government 
power arbitrarily and oppressively exercised.55   
                                                                                                                          
48 Id. Please see the Appendix for a more detailed overview of state laws that currently allow 
teachers to “pack heat” during the school day. 
49 Many states statutorily bar suits against municipalities. Plaintiffs seeking to recover against a 
school district based on a state law negligence theory should check to see if their jurisdiction provides 
sovereign immunity to school districts. 
50 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012); see also Susan S. Bendlin, Shootings on Campus: Successful § 1983 
Suits Against the School?, 62 DRAKE L. REV. 41, 49–50 (2013) (“The specific constitutional right 
implicated in school shooting claims is a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process right.”). 
51 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see also Deborah Austern Colson, Note, Safe Enough to Learn: Placing an 
Affirmative Duty of Protection on Public Schools Under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. 
L. REV. 169, 171 (1995) (explaining the monetary advantages to bringing a § 1983 claim). 
52 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
53 Colson, supra note 51, at 172. 
54 Id.; see also, e.g., Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720, 722 (3d Cir. 1989) 
(involving a suit against a school district under § 1983 and the Due Process Clause, U.S. CONST. 
amend. XIV, § 1, for the molestation of a student); Finch v. Texarkana Sch. Dist. No. 7, 557 F. Supp. 
2d 976, 980 (W.D. Ark. 2008) (involving a suit against a school district under § 1983 and the Due 
Process Clause for sexual assault); Maxwell ex rel. Maxwell v. Sch. Dist. of City of Phila., 53 F. Supp. 
2d 787, 790 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (involving a suit against a school district under § 1983 claiming a 
deprivation of due process rights for incidents of rape that occurred at school). 
55 Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986); Miller v. City of Philadelphia, 174 F.3d 368, 
374 (3d Cir. 1999). 
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The Due Process Clause provides that no state entity may “deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”56 School 
shooting victims advance the theory that they have been deprived of “life” 
or “liberty” due to the school’s failure to protect them from the violent acts 
of third parties.57 But, the U.S. Supreme Court, which has “traditionally 
interpreted the Constitution as a ‘charter of negative liberties,’ setting forth 
restrictions on government power rather than imposing even the most 
minimal affirmative duties,”58 has explained that the purpose of the Due 
Process Clause is to “protect the people from the State, not to ensure that 
the State protected them from each other.”59  
Indeed, the Due Process Clause “forbids the state itself to deprive 
individuals of life, liberty, or property without ‘due process of law.’”60  
Generally, however, a state entity has no affirmative duty to protect 
“against invasions of private actors.”61 As Justice Rehnquist best 
explained, “our cases have recognized that the Due Process Clauses 
generally confer no affirmative right to governmental aid, even where such 
aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty, or property interests of which 
the government itself may not deprive the individual.”62    
While it is well-established that a state actor does not have an 
affirmative duty to protect its students,63 courts have recognized two 
exceptions to this rule: (1) the special relationship theory64 and (2) the 
state-created danger doctrine.65 Moreover, school districts may also find 
themselves exposed to Monell liability for adopting an armed-teacher 
policy.66 In determining whether a district is liable under Monell, courts 
ask whether the underlying constitutional violation was ratified by some 
                                                                                                                          
56 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
57 Id.; see also Bendlin, supra note 50, at 43–44. 
58 Rebecca Aviel, Compulsory Education and Substantive Due Process: Asserting Student Rights 
to a Safe and Healthy School Facility, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 201, 204 (2006) (quoting Bowers v. 
DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982)).  
59 DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989). 
60 Id. at 195 (emphasis added). 
61 Id.; Matican v. City of New York, 524 F.3d 151, 155 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Deshaney, 489 
U.S. at 195); Jones v. Reynolds, 438 F.3d 685, 690 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting Deshaney, 489 U.S. at 
195).  
62 Deshaney, 489 U.S. at 196. 
63 Id.; cf. Lisa E. Heinzerling, Comment, Actionable Inaction: Section 1983 Liability for Failure 
to Act, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1048 (1986) (advancing the argument that the “no affirmative duty to 
protect” approach is misguided); Steven F. Huefner, Affirmative Duties in the Public Schools After 
Deshaney, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1940 (1990). 
64 DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 197–98 (noting petitioner’s advancement of the special relationship 
theory but declining to accept it). 
65 D.R. ex rel. L.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical Sch., 972 F.2d 1364, 1373–74 
(3d Cir. 1992) (recognizing the state-created danger doctrine but declining to adopt it in this case). 
66 See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978) (holding that 
municipalities can be named as defendants in a § 1983 lawsuit). 
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municipally established policy, practice, or custom.67 Each of these 
exceptions provides a likely avenue of recovery to victims of school 
shootings that are proximately caused by the armed-teachers approach. 
IV.  TEACHER “STATE ACTOR” LIABILITY UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
School shooting victims may bring a § 1983 action against both an 
individual teacher (the “state actor”) whose actions proximately caused 
their injuries and the school district itself, which may have proximately 
caused their injuries because of a school-created policy or practice. 
Consequently, both individual actors and the school district are vulnerable 
to liability for any injuries proximately caused by the armed-teachers 
approach. 
A.   School-Student: A Special Relationship? 
According to public opinion, many American citizens believe that 
schools should protect schoolchildren from violence on campus. This 
general consensus is reflected in the stance adopted by the U.S. 
Department of Education68 and the Obama Administration.69 This widely 
held opinion is based, in part, on the unique relationship between parents, 
schools, and the state that mandates, through compulsory education laws, 
that children attend elementary and secondary schools.70 The argument 
follows that because the state mandates that children attend school and 
parents entrust their children to schools during the day, the student-school 
relationship is custodial in nature, giving rise to a duty to protect children 
during the school day.71 To date, however, the Supreme Court has veered 
from its no-government-duty rule only under exceptional circumstances. 
                                                                                                                          
67 Id. at 694. 
68 Working to Keep Schools and Communities Safe, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., http://www.ed.gov/ 
school-safety [http://perma.cc/TWZ2-8Q4S] (last visited Sept. 19, 2015) (“Ensuring that schools are 
sanctuaries for teaching and learning—and free of crime and violence—is a priority for President 
Obama, the administration, and the entire nation.”). 
69 See THE WHITE HOUSE, NOW IS THE TIME: THE PRESIDENT’S PLAN TO OUR CHILDREN AND 
OUR COMMUNITIES BY REDUCING GUN VIOLENCE 10 (2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/ 
files/docs/wh_now_is_the_time_full.pdf [https://perma.cc/2AMT-DJGR] (stating that the government, 
along with the cooperation of schools, “need to make our schools safer, not only by enhancing their 
physical security and making sure they are prepared to respond to emergencies like a mass shooting, 
but also by creating safer and more nurturing school climates that help prevent school violence”).  
70 NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, COMPULSORY SCHOOL REQUIREMENTS, 
http://www.ncsl.org/print/educ/compulsoryschagechart.pdf [http://perma.cc/6STD-3JF5] (last visited 
Sept. 19, 2015). 
71 See Ali Davison, Note, Shackled and Chained in the Schoolyard: A New Approach to Schools’ 
Section 1983 Liability Under the Special Relationship Test, 19 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 273, 290 
(2012) (“The special relationship exception is intended to induce the state to protect those who are 
made vulnerable by restraints imposed by the state itself. When states use compulsory schooling laws 
to mandate that children are to be separated from their primary caregivers during the school day, this 
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In the landmark case DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of 
Social Services,72 the Supreme Court held that a special relationship exists, 
imposing an affirmative duty to protect, only when a state entity confines a 
person in its custody against her will, rendering that person unable to care 
for herself.73 Consequently, state entities have an affirmative duty to 
protect people who are incarcerated or institutionalized, as they are 
officially considered to be in the custody of the state and unable to care for 
themselves.74 Some courts have also imposed an affirmative duty arising 
out of a special relationship on state entities that foster children.75 
Although the Supreme Court has declined to acknowledge a “special 
relationship” between a school and its students, it has yet to decide whether 
compulsory education laws impose a duty on schools to protect children 
during the school day.76 Several circuit courts have considered whether 
state compulsory attendance laws create a special relationship between 
public schools and their students, and those circuits generally have held 
that forced school attendance does not create a custodial relationship 
establishing an affirmative duty upon the school to protect its students 
because schools are not responsible for students’ “basic needs.”77   
                                                                                                                          
limits the liberties of individuals who are already particularly vulnerable members of society.” 
(footnote omitted)); see also Bendlin, supra note 50, at 52–54 (discussing the “special relationship 
exception” at length and explaining that “when the state affirmatively restrains an individual’s freedom 
to act on his or her own behalf, a special relationship is created and the state owes the restrained 
individual a constitutional duty of care and protection”).  
72 489 U.S. 189 (1989). 
73 Id. at 199–200. 
74 Id. at 198–99 (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103–04 (1976)); see also Youngberg v. 
Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 318–19 (1982) (recognizing the substantive due process component of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to include the responsibility of states to ensure the “reasonable safety” of 
institutionalized mental patients); Bendlin, supra note 50, at 52–53 (discussing the “special relationship 
exception” in the context of incarceration, institutionalization, and “other similar restraints of personal 
liberty” (quoting DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200)).  
75 D.R. ex rel. L.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical Sch., 972 F.2d 1364, 1372 (3d 
Cir. 1992) (noting that “some courts have imposed a constitutional duty to protect foster children by 
analogy to involuntarily institutionalized individuals” and citing such cases). 
76 See Bendlin, supra note 50, at 54 (“[T]he Supreme Court has not specifically addressed 
whether a special relationship under the Due Process Clause exists between a student and a public 
school.”). 
77  E.g., Graham v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. I-89, 22 F.3d 991, 994 (10th Cir. 1994) (explaining that 
this court has “clearly held compulsory school attendance laws do not spawn an affirmative duty to 
protect,” even when danger may be “foreseeab[le]”); Dorothy J. v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 7 F.3d 729, 
732 (8th Cir. 1993) (“Public school attendance does not render a child’s guardians unable to care for 
the child’s basic needs.”); Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d at 1372 (holding that requiring a high school student 
to attend class did not prevent her from being able to meet her “basic human needs,” and thus no 
special relationship existed); Maldonado v. Josey, 975 F.2d 727, 732–33 (10th Cir. 1992) 
(“Compulsory attendance laws do not alter the fact that parents retain ultimate responsibility for their 
child’s food, shelter, clothing, medical care, and reasonable safety.”); J.O. v. Alton Cmty. Unit Sch. 
Dist. 11, 909 F.2d 267, 272–73 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that compulsory school attendance does not 
restrict a child from meeting his or her “basic human needs,” and thus a school district has no 
affirmative duty to protect schoolchildren). 
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In Morrow v. Balaski,78 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
held that a school had no duty arising out of a special relationship to 
protect two students from verbal and physical assault inflicted upon them 
by another student.79 The court clarified its holding in D.R. v. Middle 
Bucks Area Vocational Technical School,80 in which it recognized a 
difference between the type of custody that the state possesses over 
involuntarily committed patients or incarcerated prisoners and that which it 
possesses over schoolchildren.81 Despite the fact that the Supreme Court in 
Vernonia School District 47J82 recognized that children were “committed 
to the temporary custody of the State”83 for the purposes of upholding 
random drug testing of student athletes, the Third Circuit explained that 
schoolchildren are never in the full custody of the school because they 
remain “primarily dependent on their parents.”84 
The Third Circuit’s staunch position with respect to the special 
relationship rule has come under significant criticism. Commentators have 
condemned this approach, arguing that the student-school relationship is 
inherently “special” because of the requirement that children attend 
school.85 Nonetheless, since attendance at school neither relieves parents of 
the ability to take care of their children’s basic needs nor confines children 
against their will, no special relationship exists giving rise to a school’s 
affirmative duty to protect. Consequently, victims of school shootings will 
                                                                                                                          
78 719 F.3d 160 (3d Cir. 2013). 
79 Id. at 171. 
80 972 F.2d 1364 (3d Cir. 1992) (en banc). 
81 Id. at 1371–72. 
82 515 U.S. 646 (1995).  
83 Id. at 654. The Court did admonish, “we do not, of course, suggest that public schools as a 
general matter have such a degree of control over children as to give rise to a constitutional ‘duty to 
protect.’” Id. at 655.  
84 Morrow v. Balaski, 719 F.3d 160, 173 (3d Cir. 2013). 
85 See Aviel, supra note 58, at 227 (“While Scalia attempted to forestall the natural conclusion 
that the responsibility would ‘as a general matter’ give rise to a constitutional duty to protect as 
contemplated by DeShaney, the caveat was limited to a subordinate clause, unsupported by a reference 
to other case law or factual findings and utterly at odds with the rest of the Court’s analysis . . . .” 
(footnote omitted)); Colson, supra note 51, at 193 (“[T]he Supreme Court has explicitly acknowledged 
children’s dependency on school officials for protection, and it has allowed schools to relax individual 
students’ rights in order to protect the student body as a whole.”); Davison, supra note 71, at 290 
(criticizing the fact that there has been some inconsistency in Supreme Court precedent concerning the 
presence of a custodial relationship between schools and students); cf. Recent Case, D.R. v. Middle 
Bucks Area Vocational Technical School, 972 F.2d 1364 (3d Cir. 1992), 106 HARV. L. REV. 1224, 
1228 (1993) (noting that other decisions regarding the constitutional rights of students have relaxed 
these rights in order to allow school officials to promote safety); Michael Gilbert, Comment, Keeping 
the Door Open: A Middle Ground on the Question of Affirmative Duty in the Public Schools, 142 U. 
PA. L. REV. 471, 501 (1993) (“[T]he idea of foregoing the categorical “special relationship” doctrine in 
favor of a more direct inquiry into vulnerability and access to assistance is well-supported in literature 
and case law.”). 
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not find solace in the special-relationship exception to the general no-duty 
rule. 
B. Opening the “Snake Pit:”86 The State-Created Danger Doctrine 
After the Newtown, Connecticut school shooting, Arkansas Senator 
Jeremy Hutchison passionately spearheaded the advocacy effort to arm 
Arkansas teachers with guns.87 However, after participating in an “active 
shooter” simulation in Clarksville, Arkansas, during which he mistook “a 
teacher who was confronting a . . . ‘bad guy’” as being the perpetrator and 
shot the teacher with a rubber bullet,88 Hutchinson called the incident 
“utterly ridiculous” and confessed that his position on arming teachers with 
guns had shifted.89 Now recognizing how chaotic even a shooting 
simulation can be, Hutchinson confessed that the exercise “opened [his] 
eyes,”90 and that his “position now is that schools must have control over 
security systems. It’s a complex issue—police need training, and it needs 
to be continual.”91  
Hutchinson and other avid supporters of the armed-teachers approach 
have changed their tunes after opening their eyes to the potential risks 
posed by allowing minimally trained, or in some cases untrained, teachers 
and administrators to carry firearms on school campuses.92 When a school 
or its agents knowingly and voluntarily bring a danger onto campus and 
put students at greater risk, even supporters of the armed-teachers approach 
can agree that the school’s voluntary invitation of danger should trigger a 
duty to protect students from any potential injuries resulting from that 
danger. Although courts have not extended the special relationship 
exception to the no-duty rule in school settings, there is a second exception 
                                                                                                                          
86 The Seventh Circuit famously stated, in referring to the state-created danger doctrine, that “[i]f 
the state puts a man in a position of danger from private people and then fails to protect him, it will not 
be heard to say that its role was merely passive; it is as much an active tortfeasor as if it had thrown 
him into a snake pit.” Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982). 
87 Beth Stebner, Arkansas State Senator Fires Back at Claims He Accidentally Shot Teacher in 
Simulated School Shooting Exercise, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 29, 2013), http://www.nydailynews 
.com/news/politics/state-sen-fires-back-claims-shot-teacher-simulated-shooting-article-1.1440705; Igor 
Volsky, Oops: Senator Who Advocates Arming Teachers Accidentally Shoots Teacher with Rubber 
Bullet, THINKPROGRESS (Aug. 29, 2013), http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2013/08/29/2550001/oops-
senator-advocates-arming-teacher-accidentally-shoots-teacher-rubber-bullet/ [http://perma.cc/WFV6-
FLP9]. 
88 Volsky, supra note 87. 
89 Stebner, supra note 87. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. (emphasis added). 
92 See, e.g., Chelsea B. Sheasley, Guns in Schools: Arkansas District Will Arm 20 Teachers and 
Staff, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (July 30, 2013), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/USA-Update/2013/ 
0730/Guns-in-schools-Arkansas-district-will-arm-20-teachers-and-staff [http://perma.cc/8NM6-FM85] 
(illustrating how twelve Kansas school districts withdrew support for a proposal to arm teachers after 
their insurer informed the districts that they would be uninsurable, citing too much risk). 
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that would impose a duty on school districts to protect students from 
violence.    
The state-created danger exception opens a school and its agents up to 
liability by recognizing an inherent affirmative duty to protect students 
from harms that are brought onto campus by the school itself or its 
employees.93 Originally drawn from language in Deshaney,94 and now 
recognized in most of the circuits,95 the state-created danger theory applies 
when a plaintiff establishes the following four elements:96 (1) a state actor 
performs an affirmative act that creates or increases the risk of injury to the 
                                                                                                                          
93 See D.R. ex rel. L.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Tech. Sch., 972 F.2d 1364, 1373–74 (3d 
Cir. 1992) (“Liability under the state-created danger theory is predicated upon the states’ affirmative 
acts which work to plaintiffs’ detriments in terms of exposure to danger.”); see also Gremo v. Karlin, 
363 F. Supp. 2d 771, 782 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (“The rule that the state has no responsibility to protect its 
citizens from the violent acts of private parties finds a second exception when a state actor creates a 
danger that harms an individual or renders him or her more vulnerable to that danger.”). 
94 DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 201–02 (1989).  
95 Almost all of the eleven circuits have expressly recognized the state-created danger exception, 
with the First and Fourth Circuits applying it on a case-by-case basis. The Fifth Circuit has consistently 
side-stepped the question of whether to adopt it. Note, however, the Fifth Circuit is not opposed to 
adopting the doctrine. See Estate of C.A. v. Castro, 547 F. App’x 621, 626–27 (5th Cir. 2013) (“[T]he 
district court did not hold that the state-created danger doctrine was ‘not viable’ in the Fifth Circuit. 
Rather, it evaluated the doctrine, noted that the circuit has yet to adopt the theory, and concluded that 
‘the present case would not appear to provide the right vehicle for the Fifth Circuit to adopt the state-
created danger doctrine’ because ‘[t]he plaintiffs would fail to satisfy one or more of the necessary 
elements suggested in Covington.’ We agree.” (alterations in original)); Doe ex rel. Magee v. 
Covington Cnty. Sch. Dist., 675 F.3d 849, 864 (5th Cir. 2012) (stating that the court “declin[ed] to use 
[the] en banc opportunity to adopt the state-created danger theory in this case because the allegations 
would not support such a theory”). Notably, the Fifth Circuit in Morris v. Dearborne, 181 F.3d 657, 
663–64, 672 (5th Cir. 1999), in which a teacher falsely authored a report that a four-year-old student 
was sexually molested, serving as the basis for removing the child from his family home, held that a 
§ 1983 claim could survive based on a state actor’s conduct that subjected the child to the deprivation 
of rights. Without invoking the state-created danger exception, the court explained: 
The district court . . . stated that direct participation is not necessary for liability 
under § 1983. Any official who “causes” a citizen to be deprived of her 
constitutional rights can also be held liable. The district court held that the requisite 
causal connection is satisfied if the defendant set in motion a series of events that the 
defendant knew or reasonably should have known would cause others to deprive the 
plaintiff of her constitutional rights. . . . We agree with the district court that in order 
to establish Dearborne’s liability, the Plaintiffs must prove that she set in motion 
events that would foreseeably cause the deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional 
rights. 
Id. at 672. 
96 Some circuits articulate the elements differently. See Erwin Chemerinksy, The State-Created 
Danger Doctrine, 23 TOURO L. REV. 1, 15–18 (2007) (explaining how the test for state-created danger 
varies in certain jurisdictions). For purposes of this Article’s analysis, the four elements outlined above 
generally represent the main inquiries involved in any circuit premised upon the state-created danger 
doctrine. The last element, discussed in depth in Part IV.B.4, infra, has been interpreted more leniently 
in some circuits. See, e.g., Walker v. Detroit Pub. Sch. Dist., 535 F. App’x 461, 464 (6th Cir. 2013) 
(articulating the final element of a state-created danger claim as requiring that “the state knew or should 
have know that its actions specifically endangered the plaintiff”). 
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plaintiff; (2) the plaintiff is a member of a discrete class of persons, as 
opposed to the public at large; (3) the defendant’s affirmative act is the 
proximate cause of the plaintiff’s harm, and the harm ultimately caused 
was reasonably foreseeable and fairly direct; and (4) the act “shocks the 
conscience” of the court.97 
Much of the case law providing context for the state-created danger 
exception in the school setting comes out of the Third and Tenth Circuits.98 
In the seminal Tenth Circuit case, Armijo ex rel. Chavez v. Wagon Mound 
                                                                                                                          
97 See Willhauck v. Town of Mansfield, 164 F. Supp. 2d 127, 134–35 (D. Mass. 2001) (outlining 
the First Circuit elements as: (1) a state actor performs an affirmative act increasing the risk of harm, 
and (2) the act shocks the conscience); Santucci v. Newark Valley Sch. Dist., No. 3:05-CV-0971, 2005 
WL 2739104, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2005) (outlining the Second Circuit elements as follows: (1) 
“the [state] actor must have acted affirmatively;” (2) “there must be evidence that the state actor had 
culpable knowledge of the danger;” (3) “there must be evidence that the state actor’s conduct caused 
the injury;” and (4) “there must be evidence that the state actor’s conduct was so egregious or 
outrageous that it is conscience-shocking”); Morrow v. Balaski, 719 F.3d 160, 177 (3d Cir. 2013) 
(outlining the Third Circuit elements as: (1) “the harm ultimately caused was foreseeable and fairly 
direct;” (2) “a state actor acted with a degree of culpability that shocks the conscience;” (3) “a 
relationship between the state and the plaintiff existed such that the plaintiff was a foreseeable victim of 
the defendant’s acts, or a member of a discrete class of persons subjected to the potential harm brought 
about by the state’s actions, as opposed to a member of the public in general;” and (4) “a state actor 
affirmatively used his or her authority in a way that created a danger to the citizen or that rendered the 
citizen more vulnerable to danger than had the state not acted at all”); Carroll K. v. Fayette Cnty. Bd. of 
Educ., 19 F. Supp. 2d 618, 624 (S.D.W. Va. 1998) (looking to the elements that the Third Circuit 
adopted because the Fourth Circuit has not articulated its own test); Cartwright v. City of Marine City, 
336 F.3d 487, 493 (6th Cir. 2003) (outlining the Sixth Circuit elements as: (1) “an affirmative act by 
the state which either created or increased the risk that the plaintiff would be exposed to an act of 
violence by a third party;” (2) “a special danger to the plaintiff wherein the state’s actions placed the 
plaintiff specifically at risk, as distinguished from a risk that affects the public at large;” and (3) “the 
state knew or should have known that its actions specifically endangered the plaintiff”); King ex rel. 
King v. East St. Louis Sch. Dist. 189, 496 F.3d 812, 817–18 (7th Cir. 2007) (outlining the Seventh 
Circuit elements as: (1) “the state, by its affirmative acts, must create or increase a danger faced by an 
individual;” (2) “the failure on the part of the state to protect an individual from such a danger must be 
the proximate cause of the injury to the individual;” and (3) “the state’s failure to protect the individual 
must shock the conscience”); Avalos v. City of Glenwood, 382 F.3d 792, 799 (8th Cir. 2004) (outlining 
the Eighth Circuit elements as: (1) the plaintiff must be a member of a “limited, precisely definable 
group;” (2) the state’s conduct must have placed plaintiff “at significant risk of serious, immediate, and 
proximate harm;” (3) the risk must have been obvious or known to the state; (4) the state must have 
“acted recklessly in conscious disregard of the risk;” and (5) “in total, [the state’s] conduct shocks the 
conscience”); Kennedy v. City of Ridgefield, 439 F.3d 1055, 1062–64 (9th Cir. 2006) (outlining the 
Ninth Circuit elements as: (1) the state must have affirmatively created a danger; and (2) the state must 
have exhibited deliberate indifference to a danger that was known or obvious); Armijo ex rel. Chavez 
v. Wagon Mound Pub. Schs., 159 F.3d 1253, 1264 (10th Cir. 1998) (outlining the Tenth Circuit 
elements as: (1) the plaintiff was “a member of a limited and specifically definable group;” (2) the 
state’s conduct must have placed plaintiff “at substantial risk of serious, immediate and proximate 
harm;” (3) the risk must have been obvious or known to the state; (4) the state must have “acted 
recklessly in conscious disregard of the risk;” (5) in total, the state’s conduct shocks the conscience; 
and (6) the actors must have affirmatively acted to increase the risk of harm to the plaintiff). 
98 E.g., Sanford v. Stiles, 456 F.3d 298, 301–02 (3d Cir. 2006); Armijo ex rel. Chavez v. Wagon 
Mound Public Schs., 159 F.3d 1253 (10th Cir. 1998). 
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Public Schools,99 the family of a sixteen-year-old, mentally ill special 
education student (Armijo), who committed suicide, sued Wagon Mound 
Public Schools alleging that the school deprived him of substantive due 
process.100 After Armijo threatened physical harm to a teacher, he was 
suspended.101 The principal directed the school guidance counselor, who 
was aware of Armijo’s suicide risk, to drive Armijo home without 
notifying his parents.102 Armijo’s parents returned home hours later to find 
their son lying dead in the bedroom from a self-inflicted gunshot wound to 
the chest.103 In considering whether the school’s actions in sending a 
mentally ill student home without notifying the parents constituted a “state-
created danger,” the court explained that: 
The key to the state-created danger cases . . . lies in the state 
actors’ culpable knowledge and conduct in affirmatively 
placing an individual in a position of danger, effectively 
stripping a person of her ability to defend herself, or cutting 
off potential sources of private aid. Thus the environment 
created by the state actors must be dangerous; they must 
know it is dangerous; and, to be liable, they must have used 
their authority to create an opportunity that would not 
otherwise have existed for the third party’s [acts] to occur.104 
Where the proof showed that school officials knew Armijo was depressed 
and suicidal, and that he had access to firearms at home, the facts were 
sufficient to survive summary judgment on Armijo’s state-created danger 
claim.105   
1. Affirmative Act that Creates or Increases the Risk to the Plaintiff 
Many of the school district cases in which plaintiffs have raised the 
state-created danger exception have been dismissed for want of affirmative 
danger-creating action.106 Finding an actor liable under the state-created 
                                                                                                                          
99 159 F.3d 1253 (10th Cir. 1998). 
100 Id. at 1256. 
101 Id. at 1256–57. 
102 Id. at 1257. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. at 1263 (citations omitted) (quoting Johnson v. Dallas Ind. Sch. Dist., 38 F.3d 198, 201 (5th 
Cir. 1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Reed v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1122, 1126 (7th Cir. 
1993) (holding that plaintiffs “may state claims for civil rights violations if they allege state action that 
creates, or substantially contributes to the creation of, a danger or renders citizens more vulnerable to a 
danger than they otherwise would have been”); Freeman v. Ferguson, 911 F.2d 52, 55 (8th Cir. 1990) 
(explaining that DeShaney “establishes the possibility that a constitutional duty to protect an individual 
against private violence may exist in a non-custodial setting if the state has taken affirmative action 
which increases the individual’s danger of, or vulnerability to, such violence beyond the level it would 
have been at absent state action.”). 
105 Armijo, 159 F.3d at 1264. 
106 See, e.g., Sanford v. Stiles, 456 F.3d 298, 301–02, 312 (3d Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (finding no 
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danger theory is based on “affirmative acts by the state which either create 
or increase the risk that an individual will be exposed to private acts of 
violence.”107 Stated differently, the plaintiff must “allege affirmative acts 
that were the ‘but for cause’ of the risks they faced,” and mere “failures to 
act cannot form the basis of a valid § 1983 claim.”108  
In the school context, the concept is the same. Consequently, courts 
have overwhelmingly held that a school district’s failure, either to carry out 
its disciplinary policy or to intervene in student conduct that poses a risk to 
others, constitutes merely passive inaction and does not satisfy the 
“affirmative act” requirement.109 In this vein, in Walker v. Detroit Public 
School District,110 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed a shooting 
victim’s state-created danger claim against a school district premised upon 
the district’s merger of two schools with a known history of gang-related 
violence.111 The court explained that the merging of the two schools was 
not an affirmative act because “chronic gang-related violence was present 
both before and after the merger.”112 Ultimately, neither the merger of the 
                                                                                                                          
state-created danger in student suicide case where counselor did not detect signs of suicidal ideation 
and, thus, there was no creation of any danger in releasing student); Wyke v. Polk Cnty Sch. Bd., 129 
F.3d 560, 569–70 (11th Cir. 1997) (finding no state-created danger despite the fact that school officials 
were aware of thirteen-year-old boy’s recent suicide attempts because the school did nothing 
affirmative to heighten the boy’s suicide risk); Walsh v. Tehachapi Unified Sch. Dist., 827 F. Supp. 2d 
1107, 1121 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (finding no state-created danger where thirteen-year-old homosexual 
student committed suicide after enduring two years of bullying and physical assault because the 
complained-of conduct constituted school inaction (failure to intervene), not affirmative action).  
107 Kallstrom v. City of Columbus, 136 F.3d 1055, 1066 (6th Cir. 1998).  
108 Bennett ex rel. Irvine v. City of Philadelphia, 499 F.3d 281, 287–88 (3d Cir. 2007); see also, 
e.g., Ye v. United States, 484 F.3d 634, 641–42 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding that government-employed 
physician’s assurance that a cardiac patient was “fine,” without rendering more advanced treatment, did 
not constitute an affirmative act that gave rise to a claim for a constitutional deprivation, even if the 
facts supported a state law medical malpractice claim); Jones v. Reynolds, 438 F.3d 685, 691 (6th Cir. 
2006) (holding that a police officer’s observation and subsequent failure to intervene in a dangerous 
drag race on a public street did not constitute an “affirmative act” increasing any risk to a spectator); 
Stover v. Camp, 181 F. App’x 305, 308 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding that an injured driver’s state-created 
danger claim could not prevail against the township for failing to make an intersection where multiple 
accidents had occurred safer because no affirmative action was pled); Rivera v. Rhode Island, 402 F.3d 
27, 30, 38 (1st Cir. 2005) (holding that the state’s inaction, even despite its promise to protect a witness 
in exchange for her testimony in a murder trial, was not an affirmative act that satisfied a state-created 
danger claim). 
109 See, e.g., Morrow v. Balaski, 719 F.3d 160, 178 (3d Cir. 2013) (holding that the school’s 
failure to expel a student-bully—instead suspending her—did not enhance or exacerbate the danger 
caused to two other student victims); see also Robinson v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., No. 13-6632, 2014 WL 
3304143, at *1–2  (E.D. Pa. July 8, 2014) (holding that a school district’s failure to prevent excessive 
bullying did not amount to affirmative action such that the elements of a state-created danger claim 
could be satisfied); Thomas v. East Orange Bd. of Educ., 998 F. Supp. 2d 338, 353–54 (D.N.J. 2014) 
(holding that school district’s failure to prevent excessive bullying did not amount to affirmative action 
in satisfaction of the state-created danger claim). 
110 535 F. App’x 461 (6th Cir. 2013).  
111 Id. at 466.  
112 Id.  
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schools nor the school’s failure to intervene in the gang violence 
constituted an affirmative act that created or increased the risk of harm to 
the plaintiff.113   
Similarly, in Morrow v. Balaski,114 where school officials told parents 
of two female students that were harassed and physically assaulted by a 
third female student that they could not guarantee the girls’ safety, the 
court declined to find any affirmative act sufficient to satisfy a state-
created danger claim.115 After a physical altercation between one of the 
daughters and the attacker, the school suspended both students and allowed 
them to return after they served the duration of their suspensions.116 The 
court rejected the Plaintiffs’ argument that the act of allowing the attacker 
to return to school was an “affirmative act” sufficient to create a risk, 
explaining that the “[c]omplaint simply attempt[ed] to redefine clearly 
passive inaction as affirmative acts.”117 
But, in recognizing that the “line between action and inaction is not 
always easily drawn,”118 the Third Circuit in Middle Bucks explained that 
“[i]f the state puts a man in a position of danger from private persons and 
then fails to protect him, . . . it is as much an active tortfeasor as if it had 
thrown him into a snake pit.”119 Therefore, the threshold inquiry requires a 
difficult parsing out of action from inaction. “Rather than focusing on the 
often metaphysical question of whether [officials’] behavior amounts to 
affirmative conduct or not, we have focused on whether [the victim] was 
safer before the state action than he was after it.”120 Furthermore, the Third 
Circuit has emphasized, “it is the misuse of state authority, rather than a 
failure to use it, that can violate the Due Process Clause.”121 
A state-created danger claim premised upon the armed-teachers 
approach undoubtedly satisfies the affirmative act requirement. Unlike in 
Walker and Morrow, where the complained-of actions resulted in a student 
environment with the same amount of risk or danger as before the 
complained-of conduct,122 the implementation of the armed-teachers 
approach actually invites a new danger onto campus. Instead of preserving 
                                                                                                                          
113 Id. 
114 719 F.3d 160 (3d. Cir. 2013). 
115 Id. at 178. 
116 Id. at 164.  
117 Id. at 178. 
118 Id. at 177.  
119 D.R. ex rel. L.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical Sch., 972 F.2d 1364, 1374 
(quoting Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982)). 
120 Walker v. Detroit Public School Dist., 535 F. App’x 461, 464–65 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting 
Koulta v. Merciez, 477 F.3d 442, 445–46 (6th Cir. 2007)). 
121 Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 235 (3d Cir. 2008) (emphasis in original) 
(quoting Bright v. Westmoreland County, 443 F.3d 276, 282 (3d Cir. 2006). 
122 Walker, 535 F. App’x at 466; Morrow, 719 F.3d at 178. 
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the status quo, as the school actors did in Walker and Morrow, the armed-
teachers approach creates and enhances a new risk to students.  
Under the state-created danger doctrine, “liability exists when the state 
affirmatively places a particular individual in a position of danger the 
individual would not have otherwise faced.”123 When minimally-trained 
teachers bring firearms onto K-12 campuses, they are placing students in a 
position of danger the students would not otherwise have faced. 
The current guns-in-school debate has focused primarily on the 
correlation between the presence of guns on school campuses and the 
overall rate of school crimes. While the statistical data supports both sides’ 
positions,124 there is ample data evidencing the fact that the presence and 
use of guns (as opposed to other forms of weapons), because of their 
inherently dangerous and deadly nature, results in both higher incidences 
of injuries and in injuries that are more severe.125 The armed-teachers 
approach increases incidences of gun-related injuries and death by inviting 
onto campus three main threats: (a) a higher risk of misfires and stray 
bullets due to inadequately-trained, or in some cases untrained, teachers; 
                                                                                                                          
123 Monfils v. Taylor, 165 F.3d 511, 516 (7th Cir. 1998) (quoting Reed v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1122, 
1125 (7th Cir. 1993)). 
124 See, e.g., JOHN R. LOTT, JR., MORE GUNS, LESS CRIME: UNDERSTANDING CRIME AND GUN-
CONTROL LAWS 3 (3d ed. 2010) (referencing a survey that found “about 95 percent of the time that 
people use guns defensively, they merely have to brandish a weapon to break off an attack”); William 
Alan Bartley & Mark A. Cohen, The Effect of Concealed Weapons Laws: An Extreme Bound Analysis, 
36 ECON. INQUIRY 258, 259 (1998) (“[W]e find strong support for the hypothesis that the right-to-carry 
laws are associated with a decrease in the trend in violent crime rates.”); John R. Lott, Jr. & David B. 
Mustard, Crimes, Deterrence, and Right-to-Carry Concealed Handguns, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 2 (1997) 
(noting that one study suggests that overall defensive gun use saves lives (citing Gary Kleck & Marc 
Gertz, Armed Resistance to Crime: The Prevalence and Nature of Self-Defense with a Gun, 86 J. CRIM. 
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 150 (1995))); Carlisle E. Moody, Testing for the Effects of Concealed Weapons 
Laws: Specification Errors and Robustness, 44 J.L. & ECON. 799, 812 (2001) (concluding that 
additional analyses of the Lott and Mustard data confirm that the “[p]assage of a right-to-carry 
concealed weapons law tends to reduce violent crime.”). But see Ian Ayres & John J. Donahue III, 
Shooting Down the “More Guns, Less Crime” Hypothesis, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1193, 1201 (2003) 
(“[T]he statistical evidence that these laws have reduced crime is limited, sporadic, and extraordinarily 
fragile.”); Mark Duggan, More Guns, More Crime, 109 J. POL. ECON. 1086, 1087–88 (2001) 
(“[C]hanges in homicide and gun ownership are significantly positively related.”); Jens Ludwig, 
Concealed-Gun-Carrying Laws and Violent Crime: Evidence from State Panel Data, 18 INT’L REV. L. 
& ECON. 239, 239 (1998) (finding that statistics “suggest that shall-issue laws have resulted, if 
anything, in an increase in adult homicide rates.”). 
125 Carl W. Chamberlin, Johnny Can’t Read ‘Cause Jane’s Got a Gun: The Effects of Guns in 
Schools, and Options After Lopez, 8 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 281, 287 n.49 (1999) (finding that 
guns are two to five times more lethal than knives (citing JAMES D. WRIGHT ET AL., UNDER THE GUN: 
WEAPONS, CRIME AND VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 198 (1983))); see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN 
THE UNITED STATES 7 (1964), https://archive.org/stream/uniformcrimerepo1963unit#page/6/mode/2up 
(finding, based on an examination of all assaults in 1963, that guns are “seven times more lethal than 
all other weapons combined.”); Linda L. Dahlberg et al., Guns in the Home and Risk of a Violent Death 
in the Home: Findings from a National Study, 160 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 929, 935 (2004) (“The 
findings of this study add to the body of research showing an association between guns in the home and 
risk of a violent death.”). 
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(b) a school official’s impulsive, irrational misuse of a weapon; and (c) the 
risk of gun-related accidents as a result of greater gun accessibility in the 
school building.  
a.  Scenario A: A Higher Risk of Misfires and Stray Bullets Due to 
Inadequately-Trained Teachers 
Opponents of the armed-teachers approach express concern that 
armed-teacher laws and school district policies currently do not mandate 
sufficient firearms, trauma response, and other relevant training for 
teachers carrying firearms on campus.126 Without adequate training, the 
argument goes, there is a greater probability that gun-related accidents will 
occur, resulting in a higher risk of bystander injury and death.  
When analyzing states’ mandatory training requirements, both the 
quantity and the quality of the training are important. Of the states with 
statutory authorization of the armed-teachers approach, some of them 
require minimal or even no training.127 Those that do require training do 
not necessarily require simulated live-shooter training or training that will 
prepare teachers who otherwise have no law enforcement experience to 
respond during a traumatic live-shooter event in a safe manner.128  
Short of adopting inhumane and risky research methods, it is 
impossible to obtain reliable data on the effectiveness of an armed 
teacher’s response during a live-shooter event. Nonetheless, the 
overwhelming body of research indicating a high correlation between 
                                                                                                                          
126 See PEW RESEARCH CTR., IN GUN CONTROL DEBATE, SEVERAL OPTIONS DRAW MAJORITY 
SUPPORT 1 (2013), http://www.people-press.org/files/legacy-pdf/01-14-13%20Gun%20Policy%20 
Release.pdf [http://perma.cc/H2SR-FLTP] (finding that 57% of the 1502 Americans surveyed are 
against the idea of arming teachers); WINTHROP UNIV., FEBRUARY 2013 WINTHROP POLL tbl. 39 
(2013), http://www.winthrop.edu/uploadedFiles/wupoll/February2013WinthropPollMethodologyandRe 
sults.pdf [http://perma.cc/PC45-6GEA] (finding that two-thirds of the 1038 South Carolinians surveyed 
are opposed to arming teachers in schools); see also, e.g., David Beem, Back to School: Lock and Load, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 16, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-beem/back-to-school_b_37 
62195.html [http://perma.cc/4YDF-JKNT] (“[C]onsider what happens to [the odds of school violence] 
when you add more guns. For starters, there’s the increased potential for accidents. Even experienced 
gun safety instructors make mistakes . . . .”); Tim Walker, Arming Educators—A Bad Idea that Hasn’t 
Gone Away, NEATODAY (Jan. 16, 2014, 12:49 PM), http://neatoday.org/2014/01/16/arming-educators-
a-bad-idea-that-hasnt-gone-away/ [http://perma.cc/D4L5-XZSS] (remarking upon a school board 
hearing in Idaho that took up the issue of whether to arm school employees as highly concerned with 
“[t]he potential for an accident or a misjudgement”). 
127 See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-7c04(b) (West, Westlaw through 2015 1st Reg. Sess.) 
(requiring only eight hours of firearms training); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-505.5 (West, Westlaw 
through 2014 Gen. Sess.) (requiring no training).  
128 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 45-30-103(d) (Westlaw through Mar. 1, 2015) (“[A] volunteer shall 
receive any training deemed necessary by the sheriff . . . .”); ARK. CODE ANN. § 17-40-102(21) (West, 
Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.) (providing definition of “[p]rivate security officer”); 2014 GA. 
CODE ANN. § 16-11-130.1(b)(1) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.) (“[T]raining shall at a 
minimum include training on judgment pistol shooting, marksmanship, and a review of current laws 
relating to the use of force for the defense of self and others . . . .”). 
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extensive field experience/training and a law enforcement officer’s 
effectiveness in responding to a live-shooter event is instructive.129   
i.  Potential for Misfiring  
Despite undergoing extensive training, there remains a high rate of 
shooting inaccuracy amongst police officers in live-shooter events—with 
the percentage of missed shots ranging between 52%130 and 82%.131 In yet 
another study, the International Association of Chiefs of Police examined 
all shooting incidents in thirty-five American cities from 1987–1996 to 
determine police accuracy rates.132 The study revealed that 65% of police 
officers’ shots missed their intended target.133 Of course, as the rate of 
shooting inaccuracy increases, so does the rate of bystander injuries and 
deaths as people are caught in the crossfire.134   
Where the rate of shooting error for police officers is between 52%–
82%, imagine the rate of error for gun-toting teachers with much less or no 
training at all.135 Indeed, there is a high probability that the misfiring rate 
                                                                                                                          
129 See, e.g., Michael T. Charles & Anne G. Copay, Acquisition of Marksmanship and Gun 
Handling Skills Through Basic Law Enforcement Training in an American Police Department, 5 INT’L  
J. POLICE SCI. & MGMT. 16, 29 (2003) (concluding that “students significantly improved their 
marksmanship and gun handling skills as a result of the firearms course”). 
130 Id. at 17. This Illinois study showed that from 1995 to 1997, the State of Illinois studied a 
group of 216 police recruits (185 males, 31 females) with little to no firearm experience or training. Id. 
at 16. The recruits were administered a firearms pre-test in areas of marksmanship and gun handling, 
fifty hours of firearms training, and then a firearms post-test in the same areas. Id. at 17, 20. In the pre-
test, the recruits performed poorly in both marksmanship and gun handling. Id. at 22. After the training, 
however, the recruits scored significantly higher on their post-test. Id. at 21. In that same time frame, a 
review of a sample of police officers’ shooting statistics in the line of duty showed that 52% of all total 
shots missed the intended target, while 34% resulted in injury of the target, and 14% of shots resulted 
in death of the target. Id. at 17. Moreover, from 1987–1996, 696 police officers were feloniously killed 
in the United States, and 91.5% of those officers were killed by firearms. Id. at 16–17. 
131 BERNARD D. ROSTKER ET AL., RAND CTR. ON QUALITY POLICING, EVALUATION OF THE NEW 
YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT FIREARM TRAINING AND FIREARM-DISCHARGE REVIEW PROCESS 14 
(2008), http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/downloads/pdf/public_information/RAND_FirearmEvaluation 
.pdf  [http://perma.cc/8HDW-53A3]. 
132 Charles & Copay, supra note 129, at 16–17.  
133 Id. at 17. 
134 See generally Garen J. Wintemute et al., Epidemiology and Clinical Aspects of Stray Bullet 
Shootings in the United States, 73 J. TRAUMA & ACUTE CARE SURGERY 215, 219 (2012) (discussing 
stray bullet shooting victims). In New York alone, the total number of bystander shooting incidents 
doubled between 1983 and 1988—with the number of bystanders killed tripling and the number of 
bystanders injured quintupling during the same period. Paul J. Arougheti, Imposing Homicide Liability 
on Gun Battle Participants for the Deaths of Innocent Bystanders, 27 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 467, 
470 (1994). “Bystanders accounted for approximately nine percent of all shooting victims in New York 
in 1991, and about six percent in both 1992 and 1993.” Id. More recently, nine bystanders were 
wounded by shots fired by police officers during a confrontation with a lone gunman in New York. 
NYPD: 9 Shooting Bystander Victims Hit by Police Gunfire, FOX NEWS (Aug. 25, 2012), 
http://www.foxnews.com/us/2012/08/25/nypd-shooting-bystander-victims-hit-by-police-gunfire/ [http:/ 
/perma.cc/LC6V-52MY].  
135 See supra text accompanying notes 16–17 (discussing the likelihood that teachers would 
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for armed teachers is even greater than the 52%–82% rate for trained 
officers. This is especially true if the required training for armed teachers 
does not include exercises with moving targets and reality-based 
simulations.  
ii.  Ability to Translate Learned Skill into Action 
Even when teachers receive training in an effort to reduce shooting 
inaccuracy, it remains questionable whether full-time teachers serving as 
part-time security guards can safely translate skills learned during training 
into action during an actual live-shooter event. A Michigan study 
examined the inherent benefit of reality-based training in preparing armed 
officers to respond more effectively in live-shooter situations.136 
Specifically, it considered which of two widely used shooting stances 
officers employed after receiving extensive training at the firing range in 
one particular stance.137 The study revealed that officers used a different 
stance than the one they were taught to use at the firing range.138 These 
results indicate that even the vast majority of highly trained police officers 
abandon learned skills and knowledge when involved in a live-shooter 
situation.139  
                                                                                                                          
perform worse than trained police officers in an active-shooter situation). The training requirements for 
federal and state law enforcement officers provides guidance in determining what is a reasonable 
amount of training required before teachers are allowed to carry arms in schools. Federal agents serving 
in the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives are required to complete 100 hours of 
firearms training. Training for ATFE Agents, FEDERALLAWENFORCEMENT.ORG, http://www.federallaw 
enforcement.org/atf/atf-training/ [http://perma.cc/7ZNC-Z8HX] (last visited June 27, 2015). United 
States Air Marshals are required to complete 155 hours of firearms training. Training for the Federal 
Air Marshal Service, FEDERALLAWENFORCEMENT.ORG, http://www.federallawenforcement.org/air-
marshal/air-marshal-training/ [http://perma.cc/T6ZU-F7T4] (last visited June 27, 2015). United States 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents must complete a twenty-two-week training program, 
including firearms training. Training for Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agents, FEDERALLAW 
ENFORCEMENT.ORG, http://www.federallawenforcement.org/ice/ice-training/ [http://perma.cc/P5KB-
6B3J] (last visited June 27, 2015). Secret Service agents must complete twenty-eight weeks of general 
training, including live-fire training and other firearms training programs. Training for Secret Service 
Agents, FEDERALLAWENFORCEMENT.ORG, http://www.federallawenforcement.org/secret-service/secret 
-service-training/ [http://perma.cc/M2AE-EZJV] (last visited June 27, 2015). United States Marshals 
must complete 17.5 weeks of general training, including firearms training. Basic Training Academy, 
U.S. MARSHALS SERV., http://www.usmarshals.gov/careers/trainingacademy.html [http://perma.cc/ 
GF3R-PGLL] (last visited Oct. 8, 2015). 
136 See JOHN A. SEIBEL, REALITY-BASED TRAINING: SKILL DEVELOPMENT IN SURVIVAL STRESS 
RESPONSES 8–9 (n.d.), http://www.emich.edu/cerns/downloads/papers/PoliceStaff/Training/REALITY-
BASED%20TRAINING--Skill%20Development%20in%20Survival%20Stress%20Responses.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/N9EW-JCXY] (explaining the Westmoreland study).  
137 Id. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. 
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iii.  Need for Better Training: Quantity and Quality 
To be adequately prepared to respond during a live-shooter event, first 
responders must understand much more than how to point and shoot in 
static situations.140 First responders must also understand when it is 
appropriate to pull the trigger and when they should stand down, how to 
minimize the natural bodily psychosomatic responses that occur during a 
traumatic event, and how to safely ensure that no innocent bystanders are 
injured in the crossfire.141 None of these essential skills are taught in a 
basic firearms handling course or even during shooting rounds at a firing 
range.142   
One study indicated that the human body’s fight-or-flight response 
provides another obstacle to first responders during a live-shooter event.143 
An analysis of World War II and FBI studies demonstrates that humans 
possess a natural resistance to killing other humans.144 The body’s natural 
“fight or flight” response endangers even the most highly trained police 
officers. Indeed, in 1998–2000, out of 148 police officers killed in the line 
of duty, 84.5% of them never fired a shot at their killer.145 To combat this 
problem, military and law enforcement organizations have begun to 
incentivize good marksmanship scores in training.146   
“No matter how well we are trained to a stimulus/response; [sic] our 
brains are hardwired to override those trained responses by a more 
                                                                                                                          
140 See, e.g., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., FIRST RESPONDER GUIDE FOR IMPROVING 
SURVIVABILITY IN IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE AND/OR ACTIVE SHOOTER INCIDENTS (2015), 
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/First%20Responder%20Guidance%20June%20201
5%20FINAL%202.pdf [http://perma.cc/3H8Q-YP3T]; POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, THE POLICE 
RESPONSE TO ACTIVE SHOOTER INCIDENTS 3–6 (2014), http://www.policeforum.org/assets/docs/ 
Critical_Issues_Series/the%20police%20response%20to%20active%20shooter%20incidents%202014.
pdf [http://perma.cc/4XDW-4WAF] (discussing the numerous obstacles involved in responding to a 
live-shooter event, including gaining entry to a building in which a live shooter has sought protection, 
coordinating medical care, and using techniques to disable a live shooter outdoors). 
141 Id.  
142 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-12-203(h) (West, Westlaw through 2015 1st Reg. 
Sess.) (providing that although one must obtain a training certificate from a handgun training course in 
order to obtain a permit, “the applicant shall have discretion in selecting which handgun training class 
to complete”). 
143 See Active Shooter Training and the OODALoop Theory, CGPGMG (Nov. 23, 2014), 
http://cgpgmg.com/active-shooter-training-and-the-oodaloop-theory/ [http://perma.cc/X8Y5-PB8W] 
(explaining that, at the time he starts shooting, an active shooter is already three steps ahead of potential 
victims in the “Observing, Orienting, Deciding, Acting” Loop, and thus the shooter does not have to 
initially deal with the fight-or-flight reaction, putting him at a major strategic advantage). 
144 See SEIBEL, supra note 136, at 10 (discussing research noting that, during WWII, only  
15%–20% of American riflemen fired upon exposed enemy soldiers with their individual weapons).  
145 Id. at 11. 
146 Id. at 10–11. Perhaps, schools using armed teachers should provide a similar incentive system 
for teachers with good marksmanship. Teachers are already evaluated on their teaching effectiveness, 
so if schools ask teachers to assume an additional role as a security guard, where the stakes are so high, 
they should also be evaluated on their effectiveness as a security guard. 
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powerful ‘instinctual’ response in survival skills.”147 When exposed to 
trauma, the human body, as a visceral response to the fear of death, 
becomes “the most clumsiest.”148 It releases anxiety hormones, including 
adrenaline, and the heart rate rapidly increases, decreasing the body’s 
ability to successfully carry out both complex and fine motor skills, like 
unlocking and loading a gun and pointing and shooting.149 Indeed, when 
the heart rate rises to over 145 beats per minute (BPM), the body’s ability 
to successfully perform any task, including critical survival skills requiring 
good hand-eye coordination and the ability to rely on small muscles or a 
series of muscles, decreases exponentially.150 Similarly, when the 
sympathetic nervous system is activated, it sends the heart rate from its 
normal 60–80 BPM to well over 200 BPM within seconds.151 At “a heart 
rate over 175 BPM . . . [even the well-trained] officer may experience . . . 
irrational behavior such as ‘freezing in place,’ becoming submissive, or 
passive.”152   
Police officers and experienced security guards, who are in the field on 
a daily basis and whose training is of a greater quantity and quality than 
that of armed teachers, are better able to manage the body’s natural 
responses to trauma because they have more routine exposure to high 
trauma events. But when the body’s natural “fight or flight” response is 
activated, even trained police officers can abandon their training. It is 
therefore unlikely that inadequately trained (or, in some cases, untrained) 
teachers will effectively respond during a live-shooter event simply 
because they are carrying a firearm. To the contrary, the statistics 
demonstrate that arming teachers will make schools more dangerous.   
The collective research indicates that, without receiving 
comprehensive training and experience in each of the aforementioned 
categories, gun-toting teachers bring a new danger onto campus. But state 
laws that authorize armed-teacher policies generally do not dictate training 
of sufficient quantity and quality. In fact, some states do not even specify a 
minimum number of training hours,153 and those states that do require only 
minimal training in basic gun handling and fixed-target shooting.154  
                                                                                                                          
147 Id. at 14. 
148 Id. at 6. 
149 Id. at 6, 16. 
150 Id. at 16. 
151 Id. at 17. 
152 Id. at 21. 
153 See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 166.370 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.) (stating 
the requirements for individuals who can possess firearms on school property).  
154 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-12-203 (West, Westlaw through 2015 1st Reg. Sess.) 
(stating that the only training required to obtain a concealed carry permit is a training certificate from a 
handgun training class obtained within the ten years preceding submittal of the application). 
 146 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:119 
 
The potential for accidental shootings by teachers on school campuses 
is a real threat and has occurred tragically in recent incidents in New York 
and Ohio.155 Where professionally trained police officers are effective only 
18%–48% of the time, it follows that minimally trained teachers with guns 
will be less effective, putting students at a higher risk of injury from a 
misfired bullet. 
b.  Scenario B: Misuse of Guns 
Not only may teachers accidentally shoot students due to a lack of 
appropriate training and experience, but there is also at least a slight risk 
that they may misuse a weapon in a moment of frustration or rage.156 In 
2010, a University of Alabama biology professor brought a gun to campus. 
The professor shot and killed three faculty members and injured three 
                                                                                                                          
155 See Kieran Crowely, Packin’ Prof Pulls a ‘Plax’, N.Y. POST (Nov. 18, 2011), 
http://nypost.com/2011/11/18/packin-prof-pulls-a-plax/ [http://perma.cc/9U5Y-44EL] (reporting that a 
former New York City law enforcement officer and criminal justice professor at Long Island 
University stepped out of a classroom to secure his gun when he accidentally discharged the firearm 
and shot himself in the leg); Mary Beth Lane, Instructor Shoots Student in Gun-Safety Class, 
COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Aug. 13, 2013, 6:03 AM), http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/public/ 
2013/08/12/concealed-carry-accidental-shooting.html  [http://perma.cc/3EZ2-AZNU] (reporting that an 
instructor for a gun safety class discharged his gun and shot a twenty-six-year-old student in the arm). 
It was later revealed that several years prior to this incident, the instructor accidentally shot a friend of 
his daughter while the children were on a haunted hayride. Mary Beth Lane, Accidental Shooting Was 
Not First for Firearms Instructor, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Aug. 22, 2013, 7:07 AM), 
http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/public/2013/08/21/accidental-shooting-was-not-first-for-firear 
ms-instructor.html [http://perma.cc/4HPV-YNFP]. He claimed that he wanted to create a “scary effect” 
by firing the weapon into the air and thought the gun was loaded with blanks. Id. 
156 See Thomas Barrabi, Texas Teacher Punches Student, 12-Year-Old Reginald Wells, After 
Beaumont Middle Schooler Made Joke About Favorite Football Team, Report Says, INT’L BUS. TIMES 
(Nov. 15, 2013, 9:10 AM), http://www.ibtimes.com/texas-teacher-punches-student-12-year-old-
reginald-wells-after-beaumont-middle-schooler-made-joke [http://perma.cc/XU49-8C5X] (reporting 
that a Texas middle school teacher punched one of his students in the face for making a joke about his 
favorite football team); Liz Crawford, Guilford County Teacher Resigns After Allegedly Hitting a 
Student, WFMYNEWS (May 21, 2014, 7:41 AM), http://www.wfmynews2.com/story/news/local/2014/ 
05/20/guilford-county-schools-teacher-resigns-after-allegedly-hitting-student/9349073/ [http://perma.cc 
/R6M5-ETCV] (reporting that a math teacher hit an eighth grade student on the head with his knuckles 
and then shoved him into a locker and allegedly tried to choke the student); Tara Herrschaft, Teacher 
May be Fired for Hitting a Student, WAFB (Oct. 30, 2012, 9:37 PM), http://www.wafb.com/story/1990 
4833/teacher-may-be-fired-for-hitting-a-student (reporting that a Georgia schoolteacher may be fired 
for hitting a student); Rebecca Klein, Teacher Fired After Using Broom to Break Up Violent Fight, 
HUFFINGTON POST (May 8, 2014, 10:59 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/05/07/detroit-
teacher-broom-fight_n_5283324.html [http://perma.cc/EQ64-L9AA] (reporting that a Michigan teacher 
was fired after a cell phone video showed her hitting students with a broom in an effort to break up a 
fight); John Luciew, Teacher Fired for Allegedly Ordering Six Older Students to Beat Up 7th-Grader 
Who Sassed Her, PENNLIVE (Apr. 15, 2014, 9:18 AM), http://www.pennlive.com/midstate/index.ssf/ 
2014/04/teacher_fired_for_allegedly_en.html [http://perma.cc/N6P5-3HRD] (reporting that a Florida 
middle school teacher lost her job after instructing some older students to attack a younger student who 
disrespected her in class). 
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others during a faculty meeting.157 In 2012, a Florida Spanish teacher who 
was fired earlier in the day returned to school with a gun and shot and 
killed the headmistress and then himself.158 In November 2013, a substitute 
teacher at Cheyenne Middle School in Oklahoma interrupted students 
during an online test and shouted to the students who were not paying 
attention, “[i]f you don’t stop going to that website, I will shoot you and 
tell your parents you died by natural causes.”159 Similarly, in Utah,160 New 
Jersey,161 and Tennessee,162 teachers at junior high schools have threatened 
to shoot students, teachers, and staff. 
Further, the United States Department of Education has studied the 
frequency of the use of corporal punishment in K-12 schools. According to 
a study conducted by the Department, in the 2006–2007 academic year, a 
total of 268,684 students were subjected to corporal punishment.163 At least 
33,039 of those students were classified as disabled under the Individuals 
with Disabilities Education Act or section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.164 
                                                                                                                          
157 Eric Schultz, Ex-Professor Guilty of Killing Alabama Colleagues, USA TODAY (Sept. 11, 
2012, 4:53 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/story/2012/09/11/ex-professor-guilty-of-
killing-alabama-colleagues/57749884/1 [http://perma.cc/4BDT-4R6T]. 
158 Fla. School Murder-Suicide Shooter Identified as Fired Spanish Teacher Shane Schumerth, 
CBS NEWS (Mar. 7, 2012, 1:11 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/fla-school-murder-suicide-shooter 
-identified-as-fired-spanish-teacher-shane-schumerth/ [http://perma.cc/8VJL-XW87]. 
159 Michael Seiden, Edmund Substitute Teacher Accused of Threatening to Kill Students, 
KOCO.COM (Nov. 8, 2013, 8:25 PM), http://www.koco.com/news/oklahomanews/edmond-substitute-
teacher-accused-of-threatening-to-kill-students/22880522 [http://perma.cc/M3D5-YMZ8]. 
160 Teacher Threatens to Bring Gun to School, KSL.COM (May 27, 2004, 2:17 PM), http://www 
.ksl.com/?nid=148&sid=84553 [http://perma.cc/8GCA-HB8Z].  
161 Jon Offredo, Lawrence Middle School Spanish Teacher Is Accused of Threatening to Shoot 
Students in Kneecaps, Police Say, NJ.COM (Oct. 30, 2013, 10:17 PM), http://www.nj.com/mercer/index 
.ssf/2013/10/lawrence_teacher_accused_of_threating_to_shoot_middle_school_students_in_kneecaps_
police_say.html [http://perma.cc/6VDB-2N2H]. 
162 See Howard Portnoy, Teacher Reportedly Threatens Student with Fake Gun, LIBERTY 
UNYIELDING (Jan. 10, 2014, 4:32 PM), http://libertyunyielding.com/2014/01/10/teaching-reportedly-
threatens-student-fake-gun/ [http://perma.cc/A5UW-2UUQ] (reporting that in a moment of 
exasperation, a high school math teacher pointed an imaginary gun at a student and stated, “I wish this 
was real”). 
163 See 2006 National and State Estimations, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., http://ocrdata.ed.gov/State 
NationalEstimations/Projections_2006 (follow “National Total” hyperlink) (last visited July 30, 2015) 
(showing the national estimated total number of students who experienced corporal punishment in 
2006, which also includes students with disabilities).  
164 Id.; see also Mileka Lincoln, Teacher’s Aide Investigated for Stabbing Student with Pencil, 
HAW. NEWS NOW (Feb. 13, 2014, 12:36 AM), http://www.hawaiinewsnow.com/story/24710523/ 
teachers-aide-investigated-for-stabbing-student-with-pencil (reporting that in Hawaii, a teacher’s aide 
stabbed a special education student with a pencil); Teacher Slams Student’s Face into Desk & Throws 
Him Against the Wall, REPORTERGARY.COM (May 29, 2013), http://reportergary.com/2013/05/teacher-
slams-students-face-into-desk-throws-him-against-the-wall/ [http://perma.cc/QDV4-9N6S] (reporting 
that a Minnesota teacher grabbed a student involved in a physical altercation with another student, 
slammed his face into a desk, and shoved him against a wall); Paul Thompson, Teacher ‘Threw Autistic 
Elementary Student into Wall’ After He Hit and Pinched Her, DAILYMAIL.COM (Feb. 25, 2013, 4:51 
PM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2284418/Jacqueline-Zuniga-Lake-County-Florida-teach 
 
 148 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:119 
 
Teachers today are overworked, and their patience is already running 
low.165 Teachers juggle disruptive students, interpersonal student issues 
caused by bullying and harassment occurring both in school and on social 
media,166 and numerous socio-economic, political, and other systemic 
obstacles, making it difficult for students to meet academic benchmarks 
upon which teachers are evaluated.167 Thus, the classroom can be a highly 
stressful environment. While the potential that a disgruntled teacher would 
aim and fire a gun at a problem student is relatively low, it is conceivable 
that a teacher could, in a fit of rage, misuse an available weapon.168 
Introducing another dangerous variable into an already-stressful 
environment invites an unnecessary government-created risk, altering the 
status quo and opening the school and its employees up to potentially 
avoidable liability.  
c.  Scenario C: Gun Accessibility to Children and the Risk of Gun-
Related Accidents 
Another known risk invited onto campus by the armed-teacher 
approach is the accessibility of inherently dangerous weapons to children, 
resulting in a higher probability that gun-related accidents could occur. A 
teacher or administrator, who may be inadequately trained in gun handling, 
                                                                                                                          
er-arrested-throwing-autistic-boy-wall.html (reporting that a Florida teacher’s aide lost her temper and 
picked up an autistic child by his arm and leg, hurling him against the classroom wall, bruising his 
head, and causing him to lie motionless for thirty seconds after telling the student, “You hit me, I hit 
you”); Bill Turque, Student Injured by Chair-Wielding Sub, WASH. POST (May 18, 2010, 4:53 PM), 
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/dcschools/2010/05/student_injured_by_chair-wield.html [http://perm 
a.cc/2J2Q-3JEB] (reporting that a substitute teacher in Washington, D.C. threw a chair at a student, 
fracturing the student’s ankle, after the student denied the accusation that he threw jellybeans at the 
teacher); Michael Walsh, Kindergarten Teacher Caught on Camera Grabbing 6-Year-Old’s Face, N.Y. 
DAILY NEWS (May 14, 2014, 2:02 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/kindergarten-
teacher-caught-camera-grabbing-6-year-old-face-article-1.1792044 [http://perma.cc/X4XT-3LH7] 
(reporting that an Ohio teacher grabbed a six-year-old kindergarten student, “pinning him against the 
wall and clutching his face”). 
165 See Lyndsey Layton, Is the Classroom a Stressful Place? Thousands of Teachers Say Yes, 
WASH. POST (May 12, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/is-the-classroom-a-
stressful-place-thousands-of-teachers-say-yes/2015/05/12/829f56d8-f81b-11e4-9030-b4732caefe81_sto 
ry.html [https://perma.cc/PP7C-ZHZZ] (discussing a study finding that “[s]even out of every 10 
respondent[] [teachers] said they ‘often’ felt their work is stressful and nearly eight out of 10 indicated 
they recently felt physically and mentally exhausted at the end of the work day”). 
166 See Danielle Weatherby, From Jack to Jill: Gender Expression as Protected Speech in the 
Modern Schoolhouse, 39 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 89, 99 (2015). 
167 Helen F. Ladd, Education and Poverty: Confronting the Evidence 9–10, 14–16 (Duke Univ. 
Sanford Sch. of Pub. Pol’y, Working Paper SAN11-01, 2011), http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED5369 
52.pdf [http://perma.cc/NUL7-XUXJ]. 
168 See Jennifer Frederick, Do As I Say, Not As I Do: Why Teachers Should Not Be Allowed to 
Carry Guns on School Property, 28 J.L. & EDUC. 139, 143 (1999) (stating that if teachers were allowed 
to carry guns, “schools may run the risk of quick-tempered or trigger-happy teachers taking 
inappropriate action in the heat of the moment”). 
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storage, or safety, has the potential to inadvertently leave a loaded gun in 
an area accessible to children, resulting in the unthinkable.169   
The headlines all too often remind us of the inherent danger of storing 
firearms in areas that are accessible to children.170 A recent New York 
Times review of hundreds of child firearm deaths revealed that “accidental 
shootings occurred roughly twice as often as the records indicate.”171 In 
fact, “more than half of the 259 accidental firearm deaths of children under 
the age of 15 identified by The Times in eight states where records were 
available” were also not reported as accidents.172 Therefore, the risk of 
accidental killings may be even higher than reflected in the statistics 
surrounding the debate over how to protect children from guns.173  
Moreover, studies have identified a positive association between the 
presence of guns in the home and the risk of unintentional gun-related 
injuries and deaths among children and adults.174 These studies foreshadow 
                                                                                                                          
169 See, e.g., Andrew J. McClurg, Armed and Dangerous: Tort Liability for the Negligent Storage 
of Firearms, 32 CONN. L. REV. 1189, 1202 (2000) (arguing that unsafe firearms storage creates the risk 
that unauthorized users will gain access to guns, thereby increasing the risk of accidental shootings, 
adolescent suicides, and criminal misuse of stolen guns); Matt Sledge, Arming Teachers, School Cops 
Could Cause More Harm than Good, Experts Say, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 20, 2012, 4:56 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/12/18/arming-teachers-cops-sandy-hook_n_2325727.html [http:// 
perma.cc/6HEE-G7ER] (discussing criticisms of the movement to place armed police officers in 
schools). 
170 Antwan Harris, Child Accidentally Shot by Sibling, Killed on Tinsley Place, WRCBTV.COM 
(July 14, 2010, 10:56 AM), http://www.wrcbtv.com/story/12792260/update-child-accidentally-shot-by-
sibling-killed-on-tinsley-place (reporting that a two-year-old girl died after her sibling accidentally shot 
her in the chest while playing with a loaded handgun obtained from her parent’s bedroom); Pilar 
Pedraza, Funeral Services Set for Toddler Accidentally Shot & Killed, EYEWITNESS NEWS 12 (May 6, 
2014, 10:38 AM), http://www.kwch.com/news/local-news/police-investigating-possible-shooting-
involving-child/25719386 [http://perma.cc/W7VH-MEFU] (reporting that a four-year-old accidentally 
killed his nineteen-month-old brother after he got hold of a loaded handgun in a nightstand drawer); 
Sam Stein, 100 Children Died in Unintentional Shootings in Year After Newtown,  HUFFINGTON POST 
(June 25, 2014, 6:59 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/06/25/child-shooting-deaths-
everytown_n_5527932.html [http://perma.cc/2R9N-EC2U]; see also Michael Luo & Mike McIntire, 
Children and Guns: The Hidden Toll, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/ 
09/29/us/children-and-guns-the-hidden-toll.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (reporting on the devastating 
incidents of accidental deaths caused by the accessibility of guns in America).  
171 Luo & McIntire, supra note 170. 
172 Id. For example, the article describes the gun deaths of three-year-old Lucas Heagren, eleven-
year-old Cassie Culpepper, and eleven-year-old Alex Whitfield, who were all accidentally shot by other 
children who gained access to firearms. Id. However, all three of these incidents were not recorded as 
accidents. Id. 
173 Id. 
174 See, e.g., John R. Martin et al., Accidental Firearm Fatalities Among New Mexico Children, 20 
ANNALS OF EMERGENCY MED. 58, 59−60 (1991) (finding that the twenty-five unintentional firearm 
fatalities identified in the study occurred most frequently among children playing with loaded guns 
obtained from a residence); Douglas J. Wiebe, Firearms in U.S. Homes as a Risk Factor for 
Unintentional Gunshot Fatality, 35 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 711, 713 (2003) (“[T]he 
relative risk of death by an unintentional shooting, comparing subjects living in homes with and 
without at least one gun, was 3.7.”). 
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the potential for an increase in gun-related injuries to students should 
teachers be allowed to carry guns in school, especially given the propensity 
for even trained security officers to misplace their guns.175  
For these reasons, the creation and implementation of a policy 
allowing teachers to carry firearms on a public school campus is an 
affirmative act, distinguishable from passive inaction, which alters the 
status quo and heightens the risk that a student will suffer a gun-related 
injury on campus.176 Schools utilizing the armed-teachers approach are 
therefore throwing students into the “snake pit” and opening themselves up 
to unnecessary liability. 
2. Plaintiff Is a Member of a Discrete Class 
The second element of a state-created danger claim requires that the 
plaintiff be a member of a limited and specifically identifiable group.177 In 
other words, “the state’s actions [must] place the victim specifically at risk, 
as distinguished from a risk that affects the public at large.”178  
In McQueen v. Beecher Community Schools,179 five children were left 
in a classroom with an armed classmate.180 The court held that the five 
children were especially at risk, as the shooter was “much more likely to 
shoot the students in his immediate physical presence than a member of the 
general public.”181 The McQueen court rejected the counterarguments that 
(1) the perpetrator could have walked out of the classroom and fired at 
                                                                                                                          
175 See Elementary School Guard Asked to Not Come Back After 5th-Grader Takes Gun from His 
Holster, FOX NEWS (May 13, 2015), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2015/05/13/elementary-school-guard 
-asked-to-not-come-back-after-5th-grader-takes-gun-from/ [http://perma.cc/YS5V-59MR]; Holyoke 
Officer Punished for Misplacing Gun, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Feb. 13, 2014, 11:00 AM), 
http://www.apnewsarchive.com/2014/Holyoke_officer_punished_for_misplacing_gun/id-e50fbe6b3b3 
a4cbbb59ee74b706d6980 [http://perma.cc/R5EW-528V]; Marion High SRO Suspended After Losing 
Gun, WBTW NEWS 13 (Oct. 6, 2010, 1:26 PM), http://www.wbtw.com/story/21042925/marion-high-
sro-suspended-after-losing-gun; Vignesh Ramachandran, School Security Guard in Michigan Leaves 
Gun in Bathroom, Officials Say, NBC NEWS (Jan. 18, 2015, 6:10 PM), http://usnews.nbcnews 
.com/_news/2013/01/18/16590086-school-security-guard-in-michigan-leaves-gun-in-bathroom-official 
s-say [http://perma.cc/MK8Q-33PA]; School Guard Loses Gun; Policy Reviewed, REGISTER-GUARD 
(Sept. 21, 2011), http://projects.registerguard.com/turin/2011/sep/21/school-guard-loses-gun-policy-
reviewed/ [http://perma.cc/VV6T-RBDP]. 
176 See supra Part IV.B.1. 
177 See Castaldo v. Stone, 192 F. Supp. 2d 1124, 1172 (D. Colo. 2001) (stating that in order for 
plaintiffs to successfully plead a state-created danger claim, they must prove that the victims of the 
shooting—Columbine High School students—were members of a limited and specifically identifiable 
group). 
178 See Jones v. Reynolds, 438 F.3d 685, 696 (6th Cir. 2006) (stating that to satisfy the second 
element of the state-created danger doctrine, the state’s actions must place the plaintiff “specifically at 
risk, as distinguished from a risk that affects the public at large” (quoting Kallstrom v. City of 
Columbus, 136 F.3d 1055, 1066 (6th Cir. 1998))). 
179 433 F.3d 460 (6th Cir. 2006). 
180 Id. at 468. 
181 Id. 
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students in the hallways, and (2) that the general public was also at risk 
because the shooter could have walked off school property, or because 
shots fired within the school could have passed through walls and windows 
and injured someone outside.182 With regard to the first counterargument, 
the court stated that even “if the relevant group [of plaintiffs] included 
everyone in the school, the special danger requirement still would be 
satisfied” because the shooter “was much more likely to shoot the students 
in his immediate physical presence than a member of the general 
public.”183 Further, while recognizing the possibility that a member of the 
public could be injured, the court rejected the second counterargument and 
held that the risks faced by the public were collateral to and smaller than 
the risks faced by the five students in the classroom.184 
When a teacher brings a gun to school pursuant to an armed-teachers 
policy, the school environment is altered and students are placed at an 
increased risk of harm. Because this risk includes misfiring during a live-
shooter event or injury caused by a misplaced gun on campus, the class of 
potential plaintiffs undoubtedly includes those students of the particular 
school at which the armed-teacher works. When weapons are brought onto 
campus, a student’s mere physical presence on campus automatically 
classifies her as a member of a limited and specifically identifiable group 
that is placed at a higher risk than that faced by members of the public at 
large. As such, a student at a school with an armed-teachers policy would 
certainly satisfy the “discrete class” element of the state-created danger 
doctrine. 
3. Proximate Cause and Foreseeability 
The third element of a constitutional claim predicated on a state-
created danger theory requires that the state actor’s affirmative act be the 
proximate cause of the plaintiff’s harm.185 Determining whether an act was 
the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s harm is based on the foreseeability of 
the plaintiff’s injury.186 An injury is foreseeable when an actor is aware “of 
a risk of harm to an individual or class of individuals such that the actor is 
on notice that his or her act or failure to act significantly enhances that risk 
of harm.”187 In Sciotto v. Marple Newton School District,188 where a high 
school invited onto campus heavier and more experienced alumni wrestlers 
                                                                                                                          
182 Id.  
183 Id. 
184 Id. 
185 King v. E. St. Louis Sch. Dist. 189, 496 F.3d 812, 817–18 (7th Cir. 2007). 
186 See Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1209 (3d Cir. 1996) (finding proximate cause where 
police officer put plaintiff in danger of foreseeable injury by sending plaintiff home unescorted in a 
visibly intoxicated state in cold weather). 
187 Gremo v. Karlin, 363 F. Supp. 2d 771, 784 (E.D. Pa. 2005). 
188 81 F. Supp. 2d 559 (E.D. Pa. 1999).  
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to “live wrestle” student wrestlers, the court held that a reasonable jury 
could find that injury was foreseeable.189 The record revealed that parents 
had expressed safety concerns and that an expert testified that the situation 
was an “accident waiting to happen.”190 
Similarly, in Hillard v. Lampeter-Strasburg School District,191 the 
court held that a student’s brain injuries sustained during a physical 
education class exercise called “Fly on the Wall” were reasonably 
foreseeable.192 Fly on the Wall required a student “fly” to stand on a chair 
against the wall while other students taped her to the wall with duct tape.193  
Plaintiff volunteered to be a fly, and, while standing on the chair against 
the wall, lost her footing, fell to the floor, and hit her head.194 She suffered 
temporal and occipital bone fractures, had two brain surgeries, and was on 
life support for seven days.195 In determining that the injury was 
foreseeable, the court relied on the fact that the risks associated with the 
Fly on the Wall exercise had been previously reported to the school by a 
former student who choked during the exercise a year earlier.196 Since it 
was reasonable to conclude that taping a person to a wall above a concrete 
floor could result in injury, the court found that proximate cause was easily 
established.197 
In the absence of actual notice, injuries may be reasonably foreseeable 
based on a totality of the circumstances analysis.198 In Kneipp v. Tedder,199 
four police officers stopped a husband and wife for causing a disturbance 
in the street.200 After questioning the couple and observing that the wife 
was so intoxicated that she could not walk without support, the police 
released the husband so that he could go home and relieve the babysitter.201 
                                                                                                                          
189 Id. at 564–65. 
190 Id.  
191 No. Civ. A. 03-2198, 2004 WL 1091050 (E.D. Pa. May 13, 2014). 
192 Id. at *3. 
193 Id. at *1. 
194 Id. 
195 Id. 
196 Id. at *3. 
197 Id. 
198 See id. (concluding that a jury could find that the superintendent and school district should 
have known that a certain physical education activity created a foreseeable risk of injury where parents 
had made earlier complaints about the activity restricting their child’s breathing); Sciotto v. Marple 
Newton Sch. Dist., 81 F. Supp. 2d 559, 564–65 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (concluding that a jury could find that a 
wrestling coach and athletic director should have known that the practice of inviting older alumni 
wrestlers to wrestle high school students created a foreseeable risk of injury where expert opined about 
dangerousness of such practice, parents had complained about such practice, and relevant rules 
addressed such practice). 
199 95 F.3d 1199 (3d Cir. 1996). 
200 Id. at 1201. 
201 Id. at 1201–02. 
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Subsequently, the police sent the wife home alone without an escort.202 
Two hours later, she was found at the bottom of an embankment where she 
had suffered hypothermia and severe brain damage.203 
In concluding that the wife’s injuries were reasonably foreseeable, the 
court considered the totality of the circumstances.204 In particular, the court 
emphasized the fact that the wife’s blood alcohol level was 0.25%, that it 
was a particularly cold evening, and that the husband testified that he had 
to assist his wife and even carry her at times because she could not support 
herself.205 Based on these facts, the court concluded that a jury could find 
that the wife’s injuries were more likely to occur because of the police 
officers’ actions in sending an obviously-intoxicated woman home 
alone.206  
The hallmark of a § 1983 claim turns on whether the events that caused 
the plaintiff’s injuries were reasonably foreseeable in light of the 
defendant’s actions.207 “[T]he requisite causal chain can occur through the 
‘setting in motion [of] a series of acts by others which the actor knows or 
reasonably should know would cause others to inflict the constitutional 
injury.’”208 Each foreseeability analysis turns on the unique facts and 
circumstances of that particular case.209   
When teachers bring firearms onto K-12 school campuses, there are 
many potential ways in which students could suffer harm. First, an 
inadequately trained teacher could accidentally shoot a student.210 When 
teachers are armed and ready to respond to a live-shooter event, there is the 
potential that they may be more likely to engage an active shooter when an 
adequately-trained law enforcement officer would otherwise not.211 In that 
case, students are more likely to become caught in the crossfire, dodging 
not only one shooter’s stray bullets, but those of potentially two or more 
                                                                                                                          
202 Id. at 1202. 
203 Id. at 1203. 
204 Id. at 1208, 1211. 
205 Id. at 1208. 
206 Id. 
207 See Gremo v. Karlin, 363 F. Supp. 2d 771, 784 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (“[A] harm is foreseeable 
when a state actor has actual awareness, based on concrete information, of a risk of harm to an 
individual or class of individuals such that the actor is on notice that his or her act or failure to act 
significantly enhances that risk of harm.”). 
208 Harris v. Roderick, 126 F.3d 1189, 1196 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 
740, 743–44 (9th Cir. 1978)). 
209 See, e.g., Semler v. Psychiatric Inst. of Wash., D.C., 538 F.2d 121, 124–25 (4th Cir. 1976) 
(analyzing foreseeability of danger created by releasing a psychiatric patient from an institution through 
the particular facts of the patient’s background and medical history). 
210 See supra Part IV(B)(1)(a)(i) (discussing data indicating greater likelihood of shooting 
inaccuracy during a live-shooter event). 
211 See supra Part IV(B)(1)(a)(iii) (discussing literature indicating the difficulty a first-time 
responder in a live-shooter event would encounter in trying to quell the body’s natural “flight or fight” 
response so as to respond effectively in the situation). 
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inadequately trained teachers. There is also the potential that a teacher 
could misuse a firearm in a moment of rage.212 Finally, the mere presence 
of additional firearms on campus, especially when in the possession of 
untrained teachers, increases the accessibility of weapons to students. With 
guns easily accessible, a number of unthinkable hypotheticals could place 
schoolchildren in unnecessary danger.213  
In light of the data linking improper gun use to gun-related accidents 
and deaths,214 school officials should—at the very least—be on 
constructive notice of the enhanced risk of the armed-teacher approach. 
Moreover, school districts attempting to implement this approach have 
been met with significant resistance. Superintendents,215 law enforcement 
officers,216 educators,217 and even the President of National School Safety 
and Security Services218 oppose the armed-teachers approach and have 
expressed impassioned pleas to states and local school boards considering 
                                                                                                                          
212 See supra notes 156–62 and accompanying text (compiling instances in which teachers 
threatened violence or use of firearms against fellow faculty or students or actually committed violence 
or used firearms to harm other faculty or students on school grounds). 
213 See supra note 170 (compiling tragic news stories concerning the accidental deaths of young 
children due to negligent storage of firearms). 
214 See supra Part IV(B)(1) (discussing studies and anecdotal evidence linking accidental gun 
injuries and death to misuse of firearms and increased accessibility of guns to children). 
215 Kevin R. Jenkins, Area Superintendents Against Arming Teachers, DAILY J. ONLINE (Jan. 23, 
2013, 5:24 AM), http://dailyjournalonline.com/news/local/area-superintendents-against-arming-
teachers/article_2f89a0d6-654f-11e2-9096-0019bb2963f4.html [http://perma.cc/JY23-9L2G] 
(reporting that prior to the consideration of Missouri House Bill 70 that would authorize teachers to 
carry firearms on campus, Dr. Desi Mayberry, a Missouri superintendent, expressed  concern “about 
arming people with no training . . . . [as] [t]he potential for an accident involving a student would be 
something we’d want to avoid”); id. (reporting that another Missouri superintendent stated: “I see more 
potential negatives than positives in this. There is a greater chance of accidental shootings. With more 
guns, the chance goes way up”); id. (reporting that another superintendent stated: “We’re very 
concerned about the training of any teacher who would be carrying a gun on school grounds. We’re 
also concerned about accidental shootings”).  
216 James Pinkerton, Teachers as First Line of Defense?; Many in Law Enforcement See It as a 
Dangerous Idea, HOUSTON CHRON., Jan. 21, 2013, at A1 (reporting that the Houston Police Chief 
expressed concern that “[i]f we give teachers handguns, are we going to give them bulletproof vests to 
go with them, are we going to give them ballistic helmets? I just don’t think it’s a good idea”); id. 
(reporting that the Pasadena Police Chief was concerned “about accidents that could occur when 
children are around firearms” and said that “there are more downsides than pluses”). 
217 See Laura Zuckerman, Utah Teachers Get Free Gun Training in Response to Newtown 
Shooting, REUTERS (Dec. 27, 2012, 9:52 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/12/28/us-usa-guns-
teachers-idUSBRE8BR02N20121228 [http://perma.cc/PY9D-ADZG] (discussing how one teacher 
feels it would pose a safety risk if “a disgruntled student could overpower [her] and take [the gun]”). 
218 See Arming Teachers and School Staff, NAT’L SCH. SAFETY & SEC. SERVS. (July 24, 2015), 
http://www.schoolsecurity.org/trends/arming-teachers-and-school-staff/ [http://perma.cc/N8X7-H7F8] 
(discussing the statements of Kenneth Trump, President of National School Safety and Security 
Services, who stated that “it is short-sighted for those supporting the idea to believe that educators who 
enter a profession to teach and serve a supportive, nurturing role with children could abruptly kick into 
the mindset to kill someone in a second’s notice. Police officers train their entire career and enter each 
traffic stop and individual encounter with a preparedness and life-safety mindset that is different from 
the professional training and mindset of educators”). 
 2015] OPENING THE “SNAKE PIT” 155 
 
such an approach.219 Voiced complaints, coupled with the data suggesting 
that armed-teachers will be ineffective during a live-shooter event, put 
schools “on actual notice” of the safety concerns inherent in the armed-
teachers approach.220   
In short, allowing K-12 teachers to carry firearms on campus without 
proper training is an “accident waiting to happen.”221 In light of the 
overwhelming evidence supporting this opinion and the actual complaints 
and concerns voiced by opponents of such an approach, school districts 
and school employees implementing the armed-teachers approach should 
be deemed “on notice” of the multiple foreseeable risks to students. Where 
the risks associated with the armed-teacher approach are reasonably 
foreseeable and school districts have been put on actual notice of the 
potential harm, a plaintiff claiming liability against the school for injuries 
sustained as a result of the armed-teacher approach should easily satisfy 
the proximate cause element of a state-created danger claim. 
4. Defendant’s Conduct Shocks the Conscience 
The fourth and most challenging element of the state-created danger 
exception asks whether the state actor’s behavior shocks the conscience.222 
This element requires that an “official must both be aware of facts from 
which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm 
exists, and he must also draw the inference.”223 Furthermore, conduct that 
shocks the conscience in one environment “may not be so patently 
egregious in another, and [the Court’s] concern with preserving the 
                                                                                                                          
219 Americans generally do not support the armed-teachers approach. See PEW RESEARCH CTR., 
IN GUN CONTROL DEBATE, SEVERAL OPTIONS DRAW MAJORITY SUPPORT 1 (2013), 
http://www.people-press.org/files/legacy-pdf/01-14-13%20Gun%20Policy%20Release.pdf [http://per 
ma.cc/CW23-EG5A]  (finding that 57% of the 1502 Americans surveyed are against the idea of arming 
teachers); WINTHROP UNIV., FEBRUARY 2013 WINTHROP POLL tbl. 39 (2013) (finding that two-thirds 
of the 1038 South Carolinians surveyed are opposed to arming teachers in schools).  
220 Arming Teachers and School Staff, NAT’L SCH. SAFETY & SEC. SERVS. (July 24, 2015), 
http://www.schoolsecurity.org/trends/arming-teachers-and-school-staff/ [http://perma.cc/N8X7-H7F8]; 
see also Gremo v. Karlin, 363 F. Supp. 2d 771, 784 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (“[A] harm is foreseeable when a 
state actor has actual awareness, based on concrete information, of a risk of harm to an individual or 
class of individuals such that the actor is on notice that his or her act or failure to act significantly 
enhances that risk of harm.”); Sciotto v. Marple Newton Sch. Dist., 81 F. Supp. 2d 559, 565 (E.D. Pa. 
1999) (“[A] reasonable jury could find—on the basis of expert observations on the dangerousness of 
the tradition of inviting alumni to wrestling practices, a prior injury under similar circumstances, 
parental complaints about the safety of the practice, and relevant rules governing high school 
athletics—that inviting older, heavier, more experienced alumni wrestlers to practice with the Marple 
Newtown High School wrestling squad and . . . to ‘live wrestle’ with younger, lighter, less experienced 
members of the high school team . . . created a foreseeable risk of injury, and that a reasonable 
wrestling coach and athletic director knowing of such a practice, could have foreseen an injury . . . .”). 
221 Sciotto, 81 F. Supp. 2d at 564. 
222 King v. E. St. Louis Sch. Dist. 189, 496 F.3d 812, 818 (7th Cir. 2007). 
223 Hart v. City of Little Rock, 432 F.3d 801, 806 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 
U.S. 825, 837 (1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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constitutional proportions of substantive due process demands an exact 
analysis of circumstances before any abuse of power is condemned as 
conscience shocking.”224 
“[W]hat is required to meet the conscience-shocking level will depend 
upon the circumstances of each case, particularly the extent to which 
deliberation is possible.”225 Indeed, there is a continuum upon which the 
degree of culpability required for a state-created danger claim is 
measured.226 The level of culpability is inversely related to the amount of 
time the government actors had to respond to a particular incident. “The 
level of culpability required to shock the conscience increases as the time 
state actors have to deliberate decreases.”227 Historically, “[w]here state 
officials are asked to make split-second decisions in ‘a hyperpressurized 
environment,’ an intent to cause harm is usually required.”228 Conversely, 
“where officials are afforded the luxury of a greater degree of deliberation 
and have time to make ‘unhurried judgments,’” conduct demonstrating 
deliberate indifference is sufficient to establish conduct that shocks the 
conscience.229 Moreover, where the state actor is forced to “make 
something less exigent than a ‘split-second decision, but more urgent than 
an ‘unhurried judgment,’” the court considers whether the defendant 
“disregarded a great risk of serious harm rather than a substantial risk.”230 
Thus, in the Third Circuit, the three standards governing the shocks-
the-conscience inquiry are: (1) deliberate indifference, where the state 
actor has ample time to deliberate; (2) gross negligence or arbitrariness that 
shocks the conscience—which requires that the state actor consciously 
disregard a great risk of serious harm—where the state actor must act 
within a matter of minutes or hours;231 or (3) intent to cause harm, where 
the state actor makes a split-second decision.232 
In unique situations where the government intervenes in anticipation of 
an emergency and, due to its intervention, creates a more dangerous 
situation, courts have been more willing to find that the behavior was 
conscience-shocking. For example, the U.S. District Court for the District 
of New Jersey in Van Orden v. Borough of Woodstown233 stated that the 
defendant borough’s actions could be considered conscience shocking 
                                                                                                                          
224 County of Sacramento v. Estate of Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 850 (1998). 
225 Sanford v. Stiles, 456 F.3d 298, 310 (3d Cir. 2006). 
226 Id. at 310. 
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232 McQueen v. Beecher Cmty. Schs., 433 F.3d 460, 469 (6th Cir. 2006). 
233 5 F. Supp. 3d 676 (D.N.J. 2014). 
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because it failed to close Route 40, a main road near a dam, after opening 
the dam’s floodgates to control flood waters during Hurricane Irene.234 The 
plaintiff’s daughter, whose home had lost power during the hurricane, was 
driving on Route 40 to escape from the storm when her car was “‘swept 
away by fast-moving water,’” resulting in her drowning.235 After finding 
that the defendants’ affirmative acts—the opening of the floodgates, which 
caused Route 40 to become “‘inundated with raging flood waters’”—was 
the but-for cause of the plaintiff’s daughter’s death, the court turned its 
attention to the conscience-shocking inquiry.236   
Highlighting the Third Circuit’s approach in developing varying 
degrees of culpability in light of the exigency of the situation, the Van 
Orden court rejected the Defendants’ argument that the highest level of 
culpability should govern since, according to the Defendants, the decision 
to open the dam and the simultaneous failure to close Route 40 was in 
response to “‘an ever-changing emergency situation’” and a “‘hyper-
pressurized’ situation.”237 Instead, the court relied on facts from the record 
indicating that the “[d]efendants had at least several hours ‘to prepare 
and/or implement a plan for dealing with the storm’s potential effects,’ 
before opening the floodgates ‘later [t]hat evening’” and held that Plaintiff 
did not have to prove actual intent to harm.238 Ultimately, the court held 
that “[r]eleasing ‘raging flood water’ capable of enveloping roads and 
bridges and causing serious bodily injury or death, without taking safety 
measures to protect citizens, certainly could be considered conduct that 
shocks the conscience.”239  
Following the Third Circuit’s analytical framework, a school shooting 
victim claiming that school actors are liable for the injuries under a state-
created danger theory must first address whether a claim premised on a 
teacher’s (1) misfiring, (2) misuse, or (3) misplacement of the gun resulted 
from a split-second decision.   
Where the but-for cause of the plaintiff’s injuries is the teacher’s act of 
misfiring a gun, such a claim, without more, would probably not rise to the 
“conscience-shocking” level sufficient to hold individual actors liable, 
especially in circuits that differentiate between split-second decisions and 
decisions that allow for reasoned deliberation. A teacher’s act of pulling 
the trigger (and missing due to inadequate training) is likely a split-second 
decision made during a traumatic event that will not satisfy the intent-to-
harm standard, especially where the teacher’s presumed intent in firing the 
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236 Id. at 682, 684. 
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weapon at an attacker was to protect her students. Ultimately, the analysis 
will depend on the number of students in the teacher’s nearby vicinity, the 
teacher’s experience level, and other contributing factors unique to the 
particular case.   
To satisfy the conscience-shocking element in “settings [that] provide 
the opportunity for reflection and unhurried judgments,” the appropriate 
standard is that of deliberate indifference.240 Where a teacher left six 
students in a classroom as punishment for not doing their work, the court 
held that “deliberate indifference is the appropriate standard because [the 
teacher] had the opportunity to reflect and to deliberate before deciding to 
leave [the children] unsupervised in the classroom[,] . . . . [and] did not 
need to make a split-second decision that merits applying a higher 
standard.”241 Similarly, where the victim’s injury is proximately caused by 
a teacher’s misplacement of her gun, deliberate indifference would be the 
appropriate standard, as the misplacement was likely not a split-second 
decision made under stressful and chaotic circumstances.  
In proving “deliberate indifference” based on a teacher’s misplacement 
of a gun, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the official was both “aware of 
facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of 
serious harm exists,” and that the teacher drew the inference.242 A teacher’s 
act of leaving a gun in an accessible area in a school full of children 
probably constitutes deliberate indifference since the chance that a student 
could find the misplaced gun and actually injure herself or others is 
great.243   
Finally, a plaintiff’s claim premised upon a teacher’s misuse of a gun 
would easily satisfy the shocks-the-conscience inquiry, even applying the 
burdensome split-second-decision standard of “intent to harm.” Under any 
conceivable circumstance in which a teacher misused a weapon for 
punitive, intimidation, or other inappropriate purposes, the teacher 
undoubtedly had actual intent to harm. 
“It should not be surprising that the constitutional concept of 
conscience shocking duplicates no traditional category of common-law 
fault, but rather points clearly away from liability, or clearly toward it, only 
at the ends of the tort law’s spectrum of culpability.”244 Generally, garden-
                                                                                                                          
240 McQueen v. Beecher Cmty. Schs., 433 F.3d 460, 469 (6th Cir. 2006) (alteration in original) 
(quoting Bukowski v. City of Akron, 326 F.3d 702, 710 (6th Cir. 2003)). 
241 Id.  
242 Id. (quoting Sperle v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 297 F.3d 483, 493 (6th Cir. 2002); Cantrell v. 
Huckabee, 433 F. App’x 488, 490 (8th Cir. 2011)). 
243 See Martin et al., supra note 174, at 58–61 (finding that the most frequent cause of 
unintentional gun-related fatalities of children age fourteen and below in New Mexico from 1984–1988 
was playing with loaded guns found within their homes).  
244 County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 848 (1998). 
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variety negligence, without more, is not enough to shock the conscience.245  
Instead, the shocks-the-conscience inquiry asks “whether or not the 
objective character of certain conduct is consistent with our traditions, 
precedents, and historical understanding of the Constitution and its 
meaning.”246  
Where, pursuant to a school-created armed-teachers policy, a teacher’s 
misplacement or misuse of a firearm on a K-12 campus is an affirmative 
act and the proximate cause of a student’s gun-related injury, this act may 
very well be conscience shocking, and a plaintiff seeking to hold a teacher 
liable under the state-created danger theory will survive a motion to 
dismiss, exposing the teacher to potential liability. Ultimately, determining 
whether the plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits is fact sensitive. 
V.  THE MONELL CLAIM: SCHOOL DISTRICT “MUNICIPAL” LIABILITY247   
Generally, municipalities are not liable for the individual actions of 
their employees, even when those actions are unconstitutional.248 Most 
circuits will impose municipal liability under § 1983 only when some 
municipal policy or custom caused the underlying constitutional violation 
by state actors.249 Therefore, in determining whether schools are liable 
under a state-created danger theory, the complained-of conduct must have 
occurred pursuant to a school-established policy, practice, or custom, 
which essentially “ratifie[s]” the unconstitutional conduct of its 
employees.250 A § 1983 plaintiff must demonstrate “that defendants, with 
deliberate indifference to the consequences, established and maintained a 
policy, practice or custom which directly caused [the plaintiff] 
constitutional harm.”251  
                                                                                                                          
245 Kane v. Chester Cnty. Dep’t of Children, Youth & Families, 10 F. Supp. 3d 671, 691 (E.D. Pa. 
2014). 
246 Lewis, 523 U.S. at 857 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
247 Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978) (concluding that a 
municipality is an entity that may be sued under § 1983 “when execution of a government’s policy or 
custom . . . inflicts the injury”).   
248 See Ian D. Forsythe, A Guide to Civil Rights Liability Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: An Overview of 
Supreme Court and Eleventh Circuit Precedent, CONSTITUTION SOC’Y, http://www.constitution.org/ 
brief/forsythe_42-1983.htm [http://perma.cc/E7VD-7ZAN] (last visited July 25, 2015) (“In order to 
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249 Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1211–13 (3d Cir. 1996). 
250 Monell, 436 U.S. at 694; C.H. ex rel. Z.H. v. Oliva, 226 F.3d 198, 202 (3d Cir. 2000); Sciotto 
v. Marple Newtown Sch. Dist., 81 F. Supp. 2d 559, 574 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (citing Monfils v. Taylor, 165 
F.3d 511, 517 (7th Cir. 1998)). 
251 Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720, 725 (3d Cir. 1989). 
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Plaintiffs seeking to hold both the individual state actor and the 
municipality liable must prove that the state actor’s underlying 
constitutional violation occurred because the actors were behaving in 
accord with the municipality’s policy.252 
A. Constitutional Violation by a State Employee 
The first part of a Monell claim considers whether a state actor violated 
the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.253 An underlying constitutional 
violation by a state employee—here a teacher—is always a prerequisite to 
finding that a municipality is liable under a Monell theory.254 
Notably, although a municipality’s Monell liability under § 1983 is 
derivative in nature, and is therefore contingent upon an underlying 
constitutional violation of the plaintiff’s rights,255 the plaintiff “[does not 
have to] obtain a judgment against the individual tortfeasors in order to 
establish the liability of the municipality.”256 As such, a school district may 
nonetheless incur Monell liability under § 1983 even if an individual 
teacher is absolved from individual liability.257 For example, where 
“individual defendants violated the plaintiff’s rights but enjoy qualified 
immunity, or . . . the plaintiff’s injuries are not solely attributable to the 
actions of the named individual defendants,” or the claims against the 
individual defendants are dismissed due to certain procedural defects or 
settled out of court, the municipality may still face Monell liability.258 
The first element of a plaintiff’s Monell claim is satisfied by the 
underlying constitutional violation discussed in Part IV above—that is, the 
deprivation of a school shooting victim’s Fourteenth Amendment right to 
bodily integrity based on a government-created risk. The discussion now 
turns to the second element.   
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254 See id. at 692 (“[Section 1983] plainly imposes liability on a government that, under color of 
some official policy, ‘causes’ an employee to violate another’s constitutional rights.”). 
255 Karen M. Blum, Making Out the Monell Claim Under Section 1983, 25 TOURO L. REV. 829, 
850 (2009). 
256 Askins v. Doe # 1, 727 F.3d 248, 253 (2d Cir. 2013); see also Curley v. Village of Suffern, 
268 F.3d 65, 71 (2d Cir. 2001) (stating that “a defendant municipality [will not be saved] from liability 
where an individual officer is found not liable because of qualified immunity,” with the underlying 
rationale being that “the municipality enjoys no qualified immunity shield”).    
257 Sforza, 2009 WL 857496, at *10 (“[W]here claims against the individual officers have been 
dismissed without reaching their merits, it is still possible for a jury to find a constitutional violation for 
which a municipality may, [through] its policies, practices, or customs, be liable.”). 
258 McCoy v. City of New York, No. CV 07-4143(RJD)(JO), 2008 WL 3884388, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. 
Aug. 13, 2008). 
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B. Municipal Liability Based on a Failure to Adequately Train 
The second element of a Monell claim requires the plaintiff to prove 
that the municipality was somehow responsible for the underlying 
constitutional violation. A plaintiff can prove municipal liability under the 
policy, practice, or custom theory of liability in one of the following four 
ways: (1) the municipality officially adopted or promulgated a policy that 
is facially unconstitutional or unconstitutional as applied; (2) the 
municipality condoned an unconstitutional custom or practice; (3) the 
unconstitutional decisions were made by officials with final policymaking 
authority; or (4) the municipality failed to properly train or supervise its 
employees with respect to the implementation of a municipal policy.259 In 
order to show that a policy caused such harm, the policy must be the 
“moving force” of the deprivation of the plaintiff’s federal rights.260   
With respect to the armed-teachers approach, plaintiffs are most likely 
to succeed under the fourth theory of liability. Pursuant to the “failure to 
train” theory, a school district will be held liable if its “failure to train 
amounts to deliberate indifference to the [constitutional] rights of persons 
with whom the [teachers] come into contact”261 or if the district’s policy is 
“objectively deliberately indifferent to the likelihood [that] a particular 
constitutional violation would occur.”262   
Plaintiffs can satisfy the “deliberate indifference” standard in one of 
two ways. First, where there is an obvious need to train, the district will be 
deemed to have actual notice, and its failure to train will constitute 
deliberate indifference the first time a constitutional violation occurs.263 
Second, in cases where the need to train is not obvious, the district will be 
deemed to have constructive notice where there is a repeated pattern of 
constitutional violations arising from the policy.264   
In determining deliberate indifference, the inquiry turns on the 
adequacy of the training program in relation to the particular task that the 
                                                                                                                          
259 See, e.g., City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989) (“We hold today that the 
inadequacy of police training may serve as the basis for § 1983 liability only where the failure to train 
amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact.”); 
Wragg v. Village of Thornton, 604 F.3d 464, 467 (7th Cir. 2010) (“To establish an official policy or 
custom, a plaintiff must show that his constitutional injury was caused ‘by (1) the enforcement of an 
express policy of the [village], (2) a widespread practice that is so permanent and well settled as to 
constitute a custom or usage with the force of law, or (3) a person with final policymaking authority.’” 
(quoting Latuszkin v. City of Chicago, 250 F.3d 502, 504 (7th Cir. 2001))); Vesterhalt v. City of New 
York, 667 F.2d 292, 301 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (finding that a plaintiff must prove that the municipality 
adopted a policy that is unconstitutional to state a viable § 1983 claim). 
260 Bd. of the Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 400 (1997) (citing Monell 
v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 694–95 (1978)). 
261 Harris, 489 U.S. at 388. 
262 Blum, supra note 255, at 843. 
263 Harris, 489 U.S. at 390. 
264 Id. at 396. 
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individual state actor must perform pursuant to the municipal policy.265  
The plaintiff must generally prove that the inadequate training actually 
caused the underlying violation.266 
In Young v. City of Providence,267 on-duty police officers accidentally 
shot an African American officer, who responded to an incident while off-
duty, mistaking him for the perpetrator.268 Where the police department 
instituted an “always armed/always on duty” policy, the First Circuit held 
that a reasonable jury could find that there was an “obvious” need for the 
department to train police officers to properly identify other off-duty 
officers.269 Finding that the Department could be held liable for its failure 
to train, the court relied on ample evidence in the record revealing that it 
inadequately trained officers in identifying off-duty police officers.270 
Similarly, in Combs v. School District of Philadelphia,271 the court held 
that the plaintiff satisfied his burden at summary judgment of proving that 
the school had exhibited “deliberate indifference” to the risk to students by 
showing that there may have been insufficient training related to school 
procedure, which ultimately led to the student’s injury.272  
The holdings of Young and Combs indicate that, due to the inherently 
dangerous nature of the armed-teachers approach, there is a need for school 
districts to properly train teachers so they are ready and able to use 
firearms appropriately, thereby minimizing the risk to student 
bystanders.273 The deliberate indifference standard is thus satisfied if a 
school district’s failure to properly train an armed teacher results in a 
student’s gun-related injury or death. As explained above, even the states 
that require the highest number of training hours for armed teachers 
probably fail to satisfy the proper training requirements under a Monell 
analysis.  
A year after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, President Bush signed the 
Arming Pilots Against Terrorism Act (APAT Act).274 The APAT Act 
compels the Transportation Security Administration to arm and train any 
                                                                                                                          
265 Id. at 390; see also Cannon v. City of Philadelphia, 86 F. Supp. 2d 460, 472 (E.D. Pa. 2000) 
(discussing liability in relation to inadequate training). 
266 Harris, 489 U.S. at 391. 
267 404 F.3d 4 (1st Cir. 2005). 
268 Id. at 9. 
269 Id. at 9–10. 
270 Id. at 27–28. 
271 No. CIV.A.99-3812, 2000 WL 1611061 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 26, 2000). 
272 Id. at *3. The plaintiff in Combs alleged that the school failed to properly and promptly 
respond to an incident during which he was physically attacked by three other students. Id. at *1. The 
plaintiff suffered a broken jaw and psychological trauma as a result of the attack.  Id. 
273 Id. at *4.  
274 Where Are the Armed Pilots?, WASH. TIMES (Dec. 11, 2003), http://www.washington 
times.com/news/2003/dec/11/20031211-085721-8712r/ [http://perma.cc/83CW-LL5T]. 
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airline pilots who volunteer for the program.275 Once the pilots complete 
training and certification, they are known as “Federal Flight Deck 
Officers.”276 
Pilots wishing to volunteer for the program must complete a 
cumbersome, thirteen-page application and submit to a three-hour written 
psychological exam probing into the pilot’s most private thoughts, 
feelings, opinions, and emotions.277 If a pilot passes the initial examination, 
she must report to a government psychologist for a one-on-one interview, 
which many pilots (both commercial and military) with top-secret security 
clearances fail to pass.278 Assuming the pilot passes the psychological 
screening, the pilot has to travel, at her own expense, to Artesia, New 
Mexico, where she would undergo an extensive training program.279 Even 
with the stringent requirements and built-in hurdles that pilots must 
overcome before becoming Federal Flight Deck Officers, the 
Transportation Security Administration still retains the power to revoke a 
pilot’s Airline Transport Pilot certificate if it deems her a security threat.280   
Like pilots, teachers and school officials are entrusted with the safety 
of children and are expected to ensure a student’s safe passage throughout 
the school day. Despite this, most of the armed-teacher laws do not impose 
even minimal psychological evaluation on teachers seeking to carry 
firearms on campus.281   
When a student is injured in any of the scenarios posed in Part III 
above, the school district is vulnerable to liability for implementing an 
armed-teacher policy without providing adequate training or conducting 
psychological screenings of employees participating in the program. Like 
in Young, where the police department’s failure to train employees 
properly with respect to the “always armed/always on duty” policy 
constituted deliberate indifference to the likelihood of injury or death, a 
school district’s failure to properly train teachers to serve as armed security 
officers pursuant to an armed-teachers policy rises to the level of deliberate 
indifference.282 Research indicates that even highly-trained police officers 
miss their intended target in a live-shooter situation 52%–88% of the 
                                                                                                                          
275 Id. 
276 Training, TRANSP. SECURITY ADMIN., https://www.tsa.gov/about-tsa/federal-flight-deck-
officers [http://perma.cc/B52T-22L8] (last visited Oct. 15, 2015). 
277 Where Are the Armed Pilots?, supra note 274. 
278 Id. 
279 Id. 
280 Id. 
281 See infra Appendix. 
282 See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 392 (1989) (“[W]hile claims such as 
respondent’s—alleging that the city’s failure to provide training to municipal employees resulted in the 
constitutional deprivation she suffered—are cognizable under § 1983, they can only yield liability 
against a municipality where that city’s failure to train reflects deliberate indifference to the 
constitutional rights of its inhabitants.”). 
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time.283 This level of shooting accuracy is undoubtedly much lower for 
inadequately trained and improperly screened teachers.   
Thus, where the armed-teachers approach requires laypeople to carry 
firearms in anticipation of an attack, a school’s deficiency in training its 
teachers to carry out the policy safely would be the “moving force” of a 
victim’s injuries and would therefore be the primary cause of the 
deprivation of a student’s right to bodily integrity.284 Accordingly, a 
plaintiff seeking to hold a school district liable for an injury or death 
proximately caused by a teacher’s misfire or misuse of a firearm pursuant 
to a district’s armed-teachers policy will be able to establish municipal 
liability under the state-established policy, practice, or custom theory of 
liability.   
VI.  CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
With the security trend in primary and secondary schools moving 
toward a “guns-blazing” approach, and at least a quarter of states allowing 
teachers and other school personnel to carry firearms on campus during the 
school day, are American students any safer? How can we be sure that 
teachers are effective in a live-shooter situation, especially when the 
minimal training requirements vary drastically by state and are, for the 
most part, negligible?285 Finally, how can we ask schoolteachers, who are 
already tasked with the difficult mission of educating our children, to 
assume the additional role of school security guard?   
As politicians continue to rapidly push statutory authorizations of the 
armed-teachers approach through the legislative process, these questions 
will become even more critical. Before hastily adopting such laws, 
policymakers should take note of the overwhelming evidence 
demonstrating that, without adequate training, laypersons are not prepared 
to safely defend bystanders during a live-shooter event simply because 
they are armed. In fact, the armed-teacher approach actually elevates the 
risk to students during a live-shooter event. School districts authorizing 
teachers to carry firearms on campus without providing sufficient training 
                                                                                                                          
283 Charles & Copay, supra note 129, at 17.    
284 Bd. of the Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 400 (1997) (quoting Monell 
v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 694–95 (1978)); see Sciotto v. Marple Newtown Sch. 
Dist., 81 F. Supp. 2d 559, 571 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (“[A] substantive due process violation will be found 
where a school official affirmatively acts . . . [which] leads to an invasion of bodily integrity.”).  
285 See, e.g., Act of Apr. 22, 2014, § 16-11-127.1(c)(5), 2014 Ga. Laws 432, 434 (requiring only 
valid authorization by an authorized official for possession or use of a firearm as it relates to school 
safety); Safe Carry Protection Act, § 16-11-130.1(b), 2014 Ga. Laws 599, 616 (requiring general, non-
specific, and non-uniform firearms training); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-7c04(a)–(b) (West, Westlaw 
through 2015 Reg. Sess.) (requiring only eight hours of firearms training); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-
505.5 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Gen. Sess.) (requiring no training—only authorization by an 
approved official). 
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are creating a new risk, dangling students above a figurative snake pit of 
danger.  
When an armed-teacher’s use of a firearm on school grounds is the 
proximate cause of a student’s injury or death, that teacher, as a state actor, 
may be liable under the government-created risk doctrine. Similarly, after a 
school adopts a policy of arming teachers with guns and fails to adequately 
train them, it exposes itself to Monell liability for any injuries resulting 
from the implementation of such policy. Both of these theories of liability 
are viable because of the safety implications of a school’s own invitation of 
an inherently dangerous activity onto campus.   
Most states that have adopted the armed-teachers approach have 
invoked fiscal reasons as their justification.286 But, where the cost of hiring 
trained law enforcement or private security officers is relatively low 
compared to the potential cost to student lives placed in greater danger as a 
result of the armed-teachers approach, the money-saving justification 
invoked by most school districts is foolhardy and, at best, illogical.    
Finally, schools must not lose sight of the appropriate role and function 
of teachers. With teacher effectiveness under a microscope and student 
success at the crux of a national debate,287 the armed-teachers approach 
unnecessarily muddies the already murky waters.  
Teachers are already juggling more responsibilities than they can 
arguably handle effectively.288 One disgruntled teacher explained that 
“between planning lessons, grading papers, writing tests, coming up with 
activities, lunch duty, tutorials and juggling the requirements for [the 
school’s] alternative certification program, [she is] stretched to the 
                                                                                                                          
286 See supra Part II. 
287 See, e.g., Denise Smith Amos, Teacher Effectiveness Scores Still Spark Controversy, FLA. 
TIMES-UNION (Dec. 11, 2014), http://jacksonville.com/news/metro/2014-12-11/story/teacher-effective 
ness-scores-still-spark-controversy [http://perma.cc/TT92-546C] (discussing the “Value Added 
Model,” which scores teachers based on how well their students performed on state exams); Jon 
Campbell, Teachers Question “Validity” of Evaluation Scores, J. NEWS (Dec. 17, 2014), 
http://www.lohud.com/story/politics-on-the-hudson/2014/12/16/teachers-question-validity-of-evaluatio 
n-scores/20501937/ [http://perma.cc/PV9M-7XPL] (“[T]eachers are getting good marks while less than 
40 percent of grade 3–8 students were ‘proficient’ on their math and English exams last year.”); Evan 
Grossman, Report Finds Teachers Woefully Unprepared for Classroom Challenges, DAILY SIGNAL 
(Dec. 16, 2014), http://dailysignal.com/2014/12/16/report-finds-teachers-woefully-unprepared-
classroom-challenges/ [http://perma.cc/3886-APHD] (“Atop a long list of findings, the report says most 
states haven’t done enough to prepare new teachers for the higher standards their students are expected 
to achieve.”).  
288 See, e.g., Rachel Fairbank, Staggering Workload Leads to Teacher Burnout, CHRON. (Mar. 15, 
2014), http://www.chron.com/opinion/outlook/article/Fairbank-Staggering-workload-leads-to-teacher-
5318650.php [http://perma.cc/3Z9V-FGXB] (noting that with all of her duties, the author, a teacher, is 
“stretched to the limit”); Liz Riggs, Why Do Teachers Quit?, ATLANTIC (Oct. 18, 2013), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2013/10/why-do-teachers-quit/280699/ [http://perma.cc/ 
UE4B-UZV7] (“[M]any young teachers soon realize they must do overwhelming amounts of after-
hours work. They pour out emotional energy into their work, which breeds quick exhaustion.”).  
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limit.”289 “Research has shown that the most important school-based factor 
impacting a child’s academic success is the quality of her classroom 
teacher.”290 Despite this, states adopting the armed-teachers approach are 
expecting teachers to assume a dual role of both educator and armed 
security guard.291  
In comparison to the alternatives, the only benefit to the armed-
teachers approach is that it may be cost-saving for many schools. But, 
where the stakes are so high, school districts seeking to increase the 
presence of armed guards on campus should hire current or former police 
officers or trained security guards, allowing teachers to focus on educating, 
and leaving the patrol work to the properly trained experts. 
                                                                                                                          
289 Fairbank, supra note 288. 
290 Teachers and Leaders: America’s Engineers of Learning and Growth, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., 
http://www.ed.gov/teachers-leaders [http://perma.cc/4DZT-FX85] (last visited May 20, 2015).  
291 See, e.g., Lisa Fingeroot & Chas Sisk, Tenn. Schools Slow to Embrace Armed Teachers, USA 
TODAY (June 2, 2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/06/02/tennessee-schools-
armed-teachers/2383053/ [http://perma.cc/QQL3-4G9Q] (illustrating the reluctance of many school 
districts towards having a “police officer-turned-teacher or a volunteer with police experience” 
teaching in the school districts under the School Security Act); Oklahoma House Approves Bill to 
Allow Armed Teachers in Schools, FOX NEWS POL., (Mar. 13, 2015), http://www.foxnews.com/ 
politics/2013/03/13/oklahoma-house-approves-bill-to-allow-armed-teachers-in-schools/ [http://perma.c 
c/3BUU-PPSH] (explaining how the Special Reserve School Resource Officer Act “would give 
districts the option of paying for teachers to receive a minimum of 120 hours of specialized training in 
order to carry a firearm into the school”).  
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APPENDIX 
1. Alabama 
On May 28, 2013, the Alabama State Legislature passed the “Armed 
Teachers’ Bill.”292 Instead of allowing all teachers in all districts 
throughout the state to carry firearms, the new Alabama law applies only to 
Franklin County, allowing teachers and staff to carry firearms at Franklin 
County public school campuses.293 Franklin County lies in Northwest 
Alabama and has approximately 31,000 residents.294 Franklin County 
School District Superintendent Gary Williams justified the adoption of the 
bill as a necessity since law enforcement takes more than twenty minutes 
to respond to certain rural schools in the district.295 
Pursuant to the legislation, any Franklin County principal determining 
that “the safety of the students at the school is not adequately protected or 
that additional security is necessary to ensure the safety of the students or 
employees” may “request volunteers to serve on an emergency security 
force.”296 Members of the security force must be current or retired school 
district employees or residents of the school district.297 The Franklin 
County sheriff reviews the list of volunteers for each school and then has 
the option to approve or deny each potential program participant.298 Next, 
the sheriff and administrative school personnel develop “a detailed crisis 
plan” and establish other rules governing key aspects of the plan, including 
the storage and carrying of weapons.299 Further, the firearms must be 
approved by the sheriff.300   
                                                                                                                          
292 See ALA. CODE § 45-30-103(a), (c) (West, Westlaw through Mar. 1, 2015) (“Upon a 
determination by the principal of any Franklin County public K-12 school that the safety of the students 
at the school is not adequately protected or that additional security is necessary to ensure the safety of 
the students or employees, he or she may request volunteers to serve on an emergency security force 
for the school. Volunteers shall consist of current employees of the school, retired employees of the 
school, and residents of the school district. . . . Upon formation of an emergency security force, the 
sheriff, in conjunction with administrative school personnel, shall prepare a detailed crisis plan for the 
school that includes a comprehensive plan of action for the emergency security force to follow in the 
event the security of the school is compromised or the safety of students or employees is threatened. 
The plan shall also specify how and where weapons may be stored and carried by emergency security 
force members and circumstances under which certain weapons may be used.”).  
293 Id. § 45-30-103(a). 
294 Census 2010 Total Population of Franklin County, Alabama, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/community_facts.xhtml [http://perma.cc/FHE5-G9YQ] 
(last visited May 20, 2015).  
295 Ala. District to Arm Teachers, Staff, CAMPUS SAFETY MAG. (May 27, 2013), 
http://www.campussafetymagazine.com/article/ala-district-to-arm-teachers-staff/Gun_Rights [http://per 
ma.cc/QRW4-JPU2]. 
296 ALA. CODE § 45-30-103(a) (West, Westlaw through Mar. 1, 2015).  
297 Id.  
298 Id. § 45-30-103(b). 
299 Id. § 45-30-103(c). 
300 Id.  
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Security force members are unpaid, but they may receive a “salary 
supplement” from the board of education for their service.301 In addition, 
security force members may receive reimbursement for the “actual 
necessary expenses incurred in the discharge of [their] duties,” including 
any expenses related to weapon procurement and training.302 
The legislation classifies members of the emergency security force as 
reserve deputy sheriffs.303 According to the law, members must participate 
in all training ordered by the sheriff.304 The Franklin County Sheriff’s 
Office indicates that reserve deputies are required to attend and qualify 
under the Alabama Peace Officers Standards and Training (APOST) 
guidelines.305 APOST requirements indicate that trainees are required to 
complete a modest forty-three hours of firearms training.306 The statute 
itself does not impose specific training obligations. 
2.   Arkansas 
School districts in several states, including Arkansas and Colorado, 
have developed creative methods of circumventing state laws that prohibit 
guns on school campuses. Although Arkansas law prohibits all individuals 
from carrying firearms on any K-12 public or private school campus,307 
there is a statutory loophole for “registered commissioned security 
guard[s].”308 Its provisions allow the Arkansas Board of Private 
Investigators and Private Security Agencies to license and designate 
individuals as “commissioned school security officer[s],”309 which the Act 
defines as “an individual who “[p]rovides security for the school; and . . . 
[h]as received an authorization issued by the director to carry a firearm in 
the course of his or her employment.”310 As long as school districts hire 
“an individual in the capacity of a commissioned security officer or 
commissioned school security officer, the security department of the 
private business or school is not required to make application to the 
Department of Arkansas State Police for any license.”311  
                                                                                                                          
301 Id. § 45-30-103(e). 
302 Id. § 45-30-103(e), (f).  
303 Id. § 45-30-103(d). 
304 Id. 
305 Reserves, FRANKLIN CNTY. SHERIFF’S OFF., www.franklinsheriff.org/page.php?id=12&PHPS 
ESSID=6cbfa35ad08fe54472f94be801e44db9 [http://perma.cc/AZ4M-62AB] (last visited Sept. 22, 
2015). 
306 ALA. PEACE OFFICERS STANDARDS & TRAINING COMM’N ADMIN. CODE R. 650-X-4.-01(3)(e), 
www.apostc.state.al.us/Portals/0/APOSTC%20Rulebook.pdf [http://perma.cc/JP5Y-B5T7]. 
307 ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-73-119(b)(1)(A) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.).  
308 Id. § 5-73-119(e)(4).  
309 Id. § 17-40-102(10). 
310 Id. 
311 Id. § 17-40-103(b)(1). But see Keller, supra note 14, at 694–706 (providing an in-depth 
discussion of the Arkansas licensing scheme). 
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This body of law is relatively new and has been effective only since 
September 2015.  Prior to that, school boards had to seek licenses from the 
Arkansas Board of Private Investigators and Private Security Agencies 
allowing them to designate teachers and staff as “private security officers” 
under the Act.312 The Board established the requisite training requirements 
for applicants to obtain a license.313 The Board’s policies required a meager 
ten hours of training.314  
Arkansas Attorney General Dustin McDaniel issued an advisory 
opinion stating that school district employees cannot be licensed as private 
“commissioned security guards” under state law.315 As an initial response 
to the advisory opinion, the Board of Private Investigators and Private 
Security Agencies issued a temporary suspension of all school district 
licenses, but it later reinstated the licenses for a two-year period.316 
It remains to be seen whether the Private Security Agency, Private 
Investigator, and School Security Licensing and Credentialing Act will 
continue to be construed to allow licensure of public school districts as 
private security agencies.317 Alternatively, Arkansas teachers and staff can 
carry firearms on campus if they participate in the 110 hours of training 
and become a “reserve deputy,” an official law enforcement position.318   
As in other states, Arkansas’ justification for this approach is fiscal in 
nature. “Without money to hire security guards for the five schools [school 
superintendent David Hopkins] oversees, giving teachers sixty hours of 
training and their own guns seemed like the only reasonable, economical 
way to protect the 2,500 public school students in this small town in the 
Ozark foothills.”319 
                                                                                                                          
312 Keller, supra note 14, at 694–706. 
313 Id.   
314 Id. 
315 Ark. Att’y Gen., Op. No. 2013-091 (Aug. 1, 2013), http://ag.arkansas.gov/opinions/docs/2013-
091.html [http://perma.cc/9875-NRTM]. 
316 See ARK. BD. OF PRIVATE INVESTIGATORS & PRIVATE SEC. AGENCIES, MINUTES OF THE 
MEETING (Sept. 11, 2013), http://arkansasalarm.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/2013-09.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/22T4-VECN]; Evie Blad, Board Reverses, OKs School-Staff Gunmen, ARK. 
DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE (Sept. 12, 2013), http://www.arkansasonline.com/news/2013/sep/12/board-
reverses-oks-school-staff-gunmen-20130912/ [http://perma.cc/R8SX-G7P3]. 
317 See generally Keller, supra note 14. 
318 See Brenda Bernet, Teachers in 4 Districts Sign Up for Sheriff Reserve-Deputy Training, ARK. 
DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE (Oct. 28, 2013), http://www.arkansasonline.com/news/2013/oct/28/teachers-4-
districts-sign-sheriff-reserve-20131028/. 
319 Kim Severson, Guns at School? If There’s a Will, There Are Ways, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/28/us/guns-at-school-if-theres-a-will-there-are-ways.html.  
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3. Colorado 
Not long after the Colorado Legislature rejected two bills320 that would 
have authorized school districts to allow teachers and staff to carry guns on 
campus, some rural school districts found a clever way around Colorado’s 
no-guns-on-campus restriction.321 Under current Colorado law, school 
districts may allow only employees who are hired as security officers to 
carry concealed firearms on school campuses.322 Despite this prohibition, 
at least one Colorado school district has hired teachers as security guards, 
requiring them to only take a refresher course twice a year and fire at least 
100 rounds a month at the shooting range.323 The Dolores County School 
District hired two principals as security officers and entered into contracts 
with both of them, memorializing the agreed-upon $1.00-per-year salary as 
compensation for their new roles.324  
4. Georgia  
Although Georgia has historically restricted the possession of firearms 
and other weapons on school grounds,325 Governor Nathan Deal recently 
signed the Safe Carry Protection Act of 2014, a pro-gun amendment to the 
State’s criminal code, allowing certain individuals to carry firearms in 
areas otherwise legally designated as “school safety zones.”326 The revised 
                                                                                                                          
320 See S.B. 13-009, 69th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2013) (allowing school districts to 
permit employees to carry concealed handguns on school grounds). An identical bill, H.B. 14-1157, 
69th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2014), was introduced in the House. 
321 Greg Campbell, Rural Colorado School Allows Teachers to Carry Concealed Weapons, DAILY 
CALLER (Oct. 29, 2013), http://dailycaller.com/2013/10/29/rural-colorado-school-allows-teachers-to-
carry-concealed-weapons/ [http://perma.cc/Y4RC-V8TE]. 
322 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-12-214(3)(b) (West, Westlaw through July 1, 2015). 
323 Campbell, supra note 321. 
324 Colo. School Districts Quietly Taking Up Arms While Gun Debate Rages in Denver, DAILY 
CALLER (Feb. 18, 2013, 2:07 PM), http://dailycaller.com/2013/02/18/colo-school-districts-quietly-
taking-up-arms-while-gun-debate-rages-in-denver/ [http://perma.cc/5Q4D-X5AY]; Rural Colorado 
School District Arms Administrators, Bypasses Colorado Gun Laws, HUFFINGTON POST (May 6, 2013, 
2:59 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/05/06/rural-colorado-school-dis_n_3224474.html 
[http://perma.cc/Y6RS-KYGY]. 
325 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-127.1(b)(1) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.) 
(making it unlawful to “carry to or to possess . . . [a weapon or explosive] within a school safety 
zone”). 
326 Safe Carry Protection Act, § 1-6(c)(6), 2014 Ga. Laws 599, 606; see also Herbert Buchsbaum, 
Amid Wave of Pro-Gun Legislation, Georgia Proposes Sweeping Law, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 24, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/25/us/amid-wave-of-pro-gun-legislation-georgia-proposes 
-sweeping-law.html (characterizing the breadth of the law as “breathtaking”); Steve Osunsami, Georgia 
Governor Signs Law Allowing Guns in Schools, Churches, Bars, ABC NEWS (Apr. 23, 2014), 
http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/headlines/2014/04/georgia-governor-signs-law-allowing-guns-in-schools-
churches-bars/. Governor Nathan Deal proudly announced, “As governor I signed every Second 
Amendment piece of legislation that has been placed on my desk and today I will put into law a gun 
bill that heralds self-defense, personal liberties and public safety.” Id. 
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statute, dubbed by critics as the “guns everywhere” bill,”327 took effect on 
July 1, 2014 and allows any “duly authorized official of a public or private 
elementary or secondary school or a public or private technical school, 
vocational school, college, university, or other institution of post-
secondary education or a local board of education” to possess or use a 
firearm which would otherwise be prohibited by the Georgia Code within a 
school safety zone, at a school function, or on a bus or other transportation 
provided by a school.328 While the law does require boards of education to 
adopt a policy with specific provisions governing the training of personnel 
approved to carry weapons on campus, it fails to specify a minimum 
number of required training hours.329 
5. Indiana 
Indiana’s Governor recently signed legislation allowing individuals to 
store firearms in their vehicles on campus property.330 The legislation 
provides defenses to prosecution of gun-related offenses for storing 
firearms in a locked vehicle outside of plain sight.331  
While the legislation does not directly discuss the use of firearms on 
school property, in northeast Indiana, a sheriff offered to deputize teachers 
to carry handguns in their classrooms less than a week after the Newtown, 
Connecticut school shooting.332 Although a generous community member 
donated $27,000 in firearms and three Indiana school districts expressed a 
desire to participate in the sheriff’s plan, the effort was foiled when an 
insurance company stated that it would refuse to provide workers’ 
compensation coverage to schools with gun-carrying staff members.333 
6. Kansas 
On April 16, 2013, the Kansas Legislature passed a law that authorizes 
a public school district to allow any individual, school employee or 
                                                                                                                          
327 Osunsami, supra note 326. A spokesperson from Americans for Responsible Solutions, a 
fierce opponent of the bill, summarized it as follows: “Among its many extreme provisions, it allows 
guns in TSA lines at the country’s busiest airport, forces community school boards into bitter, divisive 
debates about whether they should allow guns in their children’s classrooms, and broadens the conceal 
carry eligibility to people who have previously committed crimes with guns.” Devon M. Sayers & 
Elliott C. McLaughlin, Georgia Law Allows Guns in Some Schools, Bars, Churches, CNN (Apr. 23, 
2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/04/23/us/georgia-governor-signs-gun-bill/ [http://perma.cc/8MQM-
WA6Y]. 
328 Safe Carry Protection Act, § 1-6(c)(6), 2014 Ga. Laws at 606.  
329 See id. § 1-9(b), 2014 Ga. Laws at 616. 
330 Act of Mar. 26, 2014, § 4(b)(5), 2014 Ind. Laws 1877, 1883.  
331 Id. § 5(b), 2014 Ind. Laws at 1884. 
332 Steven Yaccino, Schools Seeking to Arm Employees Hit Hurdle on Insurance, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 7, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/08/us/schools-seeking-to-arm-employees-hit-hurdle-
on-insurance.html. 
333 Id. 
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otherwise, to carry a concealed weapon on school district property.334 The 
law establishes no minimum standards for school district policies regarding 
the possession of firearms on school property other than the requirements 
for obtaining concealed carry licensure.335 In addition to other basic 
requirements, Kansas imposes modest training requirements for individuals 
to obtain a concealed carry permit; indeed, the statute only requires 
applicants for concealed carry licenses to complete an accredited eight-
hour handgun safety course.336 The law does not specify additional firearm 
or other experiential training requirements. 
Like the Indiana gun law, the new Kansas law may make it difficult for 
school districts to obtain insurance coverage. After the new regulations 
became law, EMC Insurance Company, the liability insurer for ninety 
percent of Kansas’ school districts, cautioned that any districts in the state 
permitting employees to carry concealed handguns on school property 
would lose or be denied coverage.337 
7. Oregon 
In Oregon, state law permits individuals “authorized by the officer or 
agency that controls the public building to possess a firearm or dangerous 
weapon in that public building.”338 The law has been in place for more than 
twenty years.339 Notwithstanding the state’s expansive concealed carry 
laws, Oregon school districts may impose more limiting weapons 
restrictions on school staff, and many Oregon districts ban guns on campus 
grounds.340 During the state’s last legislative session, a bill that would have 
prohibited all concealed weapons in schools failed in committee with 
meager support.341  
Nearly a year after the tragic shooting at Sandy Hook Elementary, at 
least one Oregon school district lifted a ban that prevented teachers with 
                                                                                                                          
334 Act of Apr. 16, 2013, § 9(d), 2013 Kan. Laws 551, 571. 
335 See id.  
336 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-7c04(b)(1) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.). 
337 Yaccino, supra note 332. 
338 OR. REV. STAT. § 166.370(3)(h) (West, Westlaw through Oct. 5, 2015). 
339 The specific provision has existed since 1979 and only has been amended once to include the 
language “or dangerous weapon.” See Act of July 16, 1979, § 2, 1979 Or. Laws 489, 489. 
340 See, e.g., Kristina Chew, Oregon Bans Guns on State University Campuses, CARE2 (Mar. 4, 
2012, 1:53 PM), http://www.care2.com/causes/oregon-bans-guns-on-state-university-campuses.html 
[http://perma.cc/CU3A-WN5W] (discussing the Oregon State Board of Higher Education’s decision to 
ban guns on seven of its state university campuses). 
341 See Jeff Mapes, Oregon Gun Bills in Serious Trouble as Courtney Keeps Them from Full 
Senate, OREGONIAN (May 6, 2013), http://www.oregonlive.com/mapes/index.ssf/2013/05/ 
oregon_gun_bills_in_serious_tr.html [http://perma.cc/4E5E-UZ3E] (explaining the decision by the 
Oregon Senate President to block four gun-control bills). 
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concealed weapon permits from possessing firearms on campus.342 At the 
4-1 vote, during which the St. Helens School Board received no feedback 
from teachers in the district about their opinions on the matter, the Board 
imposed no restrictions, training requirements, or policy guidelines on the 
seven schools within the district.343 Other school boards have considered 
following St. Helens’ lead and lifting the concealed weapons ban on school 
campuses across Oregon.344 
8. South Dakota 
On March 8, 2013, the South Dakota Legislature passed a law that 
authorizes any school board to “create, establish, and supervise the arming 
of school employees, hired security personnel, or volunteers,” to be known 
as “school sentinels.”345 School district sentinel programs must be 
approved by the local law enforcement official with jurisdiction over the 
district.346 
Sentinels must complete a training course “as defined by the Law 
Enforcement Officers Standards Commission.”347 The South Dakota 
Division of Criminal Investigation has developed minimum standards for 
school sentinels.348 Minimum standards include “good moral character,” an 
examination by a physician for ability to perform duties, and at least eighty 
hours of training with yearly renewal tests.349 Sentinels must also maintain 
their concealed carry licensure.350 
The South Dakota law was enacted to ameliorate the economic burden 
of providing effective security in public schools. In South Dakota, bill 
sponsor Representative Scott Craig of Rapid City explained that rural 
districts do not have sufficient funding to support expenditures on full-time 
                                                                                                                          
342 See Alexis Shaw, Ore. School Board Votes to Allow Staff to Pack Heat at School, ABC NEWS 
(Oct. 26, 2013), http://abcnews.go.com/US/ore-school-board-votes-staff-pack-heat-school/story?id=2 
0692287. 
343 Id.; see also ST. HELENS SCH. DIST. #502, BOARD OF DIRECTORS REGULAR MEETING 
MINUTES (Oct. 23, 2013), http://www.sthelens.k12.or.us/cms/lib05/OR01000906/Centricity/Domain/ 
706/RegularMeetingMinutes10.23.2013.pdf [http://perma.cc/AX5S-6F84].  
344 See, e.g., Michael Bamesberger, Estacada School Board Discusses Allowing Staff, Teachers to 
Carry Concealed Weapons, OREGONIAN (Nov. 22, 2013, 3:05 PM), http://www.oregonlive.com/ 
clackamascounty/index.ssf/2013/11/estacada_school_board_opens_di.html [http://perma.cc/HNK6-
Y6AN] (explaining that the Estacada School District and the Eagle Point School District are 
considering altering their weapons policies so that teachers and school staff may carry concealed 
weapons on campus). 
345 Act of Mar. 8, 2013, § 1, 2013 S.D. Sess. Laws 210, 210. 
346 Id. § 2, 2013 S.D. Sess. Laws at 210. 
347 Id. § 3, 2013 S.D. Sess. Laws at 210. 
348 S.D. DIV. OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION, SCHOOL SENTINEL 2–4, dci.sd.gov/LinkClick.aspx 
?fileticket=gG3T8JZk7Ag%3D&tabid=555 [http://perma.cc/MEK3-KV3U] (last visited Aug. 13, 
2015).  
349 Id. at 2, 5.   
350 Act of Mar. 8, 2013, § 5, 2013 S.D. Sess. Laws at 210.  
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law enforcement officers and, as a result, “they are interested in arming 
teachers or volunteers.”351 
9. Tennessee  
Tennessee’s guns-in-schools law went into effect on July 1, 2013.352 
The law allows school employees and persons “assigned to a school in 
accordance with a memorandum of understanding between the chief of the 
appropriate law enforcement agency and the [school district]” to carry 
firearms on campus.353 
Tennessee requires that individuals wishing to possess firearms on 
school property have a concealed carry license, receive written permission 
from both the “director of schools” and school principal, and be a “law 
enforcement officer, or have prior service as a law enforcement officer.”354 
The law mandates forty hours of basic training in school policing.355 
10. Texas 
The Protection of Texas Children Act, the Texas guns-in-school 
legislation, went into effect on June 14, 2013.356 The law allows school 
districts to appoint “school marshals” that carry firearms according to the 
district’s written regulations and only at specific schools approved by the 
district.357  
The law specifies several topics that must be included or addressed by 
districts in their written school policies. Applicants must be school 
employees holding concealed handgun licenses.358 In addition, district 
training programs are required to include eighty hours of instruction and 
psychological examinations.359 However, a marshal that has “regular, 
direct contact with students” may not carry a concealed handgun.360 
Instead, the law requires the marshal to store the firearm “in a locked and 
secured safe within the marshal’s immediate reach when conducting the 
marshal’s primary duty.”361 In addition, the law limits the presence of guns 
on campus by restricting the number of school marshals to one per every 
                                                                                                                          
351 South Dakota Governor Signs Bill Allowing Armed Teachers in the Classroom, FOX NEWS 
(Mar. 8, 2013), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2013/03/08/sd-governor-signs-bill-allowing-teachers-
to-be-armed/ [http://perma.cc/3MQF-FRJY]. 
352 TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-815 (West, Westlaw through 2015 1st Reg. Sess.). 
353 Id. § 49-6-815(a). 
354 Id. § 49-6-815(b). 
355 Id. § 49-6-815(b)(3). 
356 Protection of Texas Children Act, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws 1742, 1746. 
357 Id. § 3, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws at 1742–43. 
358 Id. § 5, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws at 1743. 
359 Id. § 5, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws at 1743–44. 
360 Id. § 3, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws at 1743. 
361 Id.  
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400 students.362 Opponents of this approach worry about gun access and its 
potential to result in an increase of gun-related injuries and death on 
campus.363 
11. Utah 
Utah is one of the only states that authorizes individuals who hold 
concealed carry permits to carry licensed, concealed weapons onto public 
school campuses without exception.364 Thus, it is inferred that teachers 
who hold concealed carry licenses could do so. In order to be issued a 
license and be allowed to carry a concealed gun, an individual must, 
among other things, pass a background check and undergo the required 
training.365 Thus, in Utah, teachers who meet all of the statutory licensing 
requirements are eligible to obtain a license and carry a concealed gun into 
public schools. Because permit records are closed to the public,366 parents 
have no way of knowing which teachers carry weapons. 
12. Other States 
Numerous other states’ laws require only school board approval, or 
sometimes even less stringent requirements, in order to arm district 
employees.367 Hawaii’s and New Hampshire’s silence on the issue of 
                                                                                                                          
362 Id. § 3, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws at 1742. 
363 See David Conrads, Texas School Marshals: Armed and Covert, but Will They Help?, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (July 31, 2014), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Education/2014/0731/ 
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364 See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-505.5(4)(a) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Gen. Sess.) 
(providing that the ban does not apply to those authorized to possess a firearm who have official 
permits as regulated by statute); id. § 76-10-505.5(4)(b) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Gen. Sess.) 
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“possession is approved by the responsible school administrator”). 
365 See UTAH CODE ANN. § 53-5-704 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Gen. Sess.) (requiring a 
variety of identifying documents and training to obtain “general familiarity”). 
366 UTAH CODE ANN. § 53-5-708(1)(b), (c) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Gen. Sess.). 
367 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 11.61.210 (West, Westlaw through 2015 1st Reg. Sess.) 
(stating that a person commits a crime in the fourth degree if they possess a weapon without “the 
permission of the chief administrative officer of the school or district or the designee of the chief 
administrative officer, within the buildings of, on the grounds of, or on the school parking lot of a 
public or private preschool, elementary, junior high, or secondary school”); CAL. PENAL CODE § 626.9 
(West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.) (allowing the possession of a firearm in a school zone with 
the permission of the school district superintendent or his designee); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-
217b (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess. and June Spec. Sess.) (excepting from conviction those 
carrying weapons on school grounds when possessing the weapon as a part of a program approved by 
school officials); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-3302D(4)(b) (West, Westlaw through 2015 1st Reg. Sess. 
and 1st Ex. Sess.) (excepting from punishment those possessing weapons on school grounds “as an 
appropriate part of a program, an event, activity or other circumstance approved by the board of 
trustees or governing board”); IOWA CODE ANN. § 724.4B(2)(b) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. 
Sess.) (excepting from punishment those carrying weapons on school grounds who have been 
“specifically authorized by the school” to do so); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 527.070(3)(f) (West, Westlaw 
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allowing district employees to carry concealed firearms has been 
interpreted to effectively allow the practice.368 
At least nineteen states have recently proposed legislation regarding 
the possession of firearms by district employees on K-12 school 
campuses.369 
                                                                                                                          
through 2015 Reg. Sess.) (excepting “[a]ny other persons . . . who have been authorized to carry a 
firearm by the board of education or board of trustees of the public or private institution” from 
punishment); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 269, § 10(j) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 84 of 1st Annual 
Sess.) (excepting from punishment those with authorization from a school board or officer in charge to 
carry firearms on school grounds); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-361(3)(b) (West, Westlaw through 
chapters effective July 1, 2015, 2015 Sess.) (“The trustees of a district may grant persons and entities 
advance permission to possess, carry, or store a weapon in a school building.”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 
2C:39-5 (West, Westlaw through 2015 legislation) (excepting those with permission from governing 
officer of institution from punishment when carrying weapons on school grounds); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 
265.01-a (McKinney, Westlaw through Ch. 1–238 of L.2015) (excepting those with written 
authorization from an educational institution from penalty for carrying weapon on school grounds) . 
368 Guns in Schools in Hawaii, L. CTR. TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE (Jan. 2, 2012), 
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